盈利性导向下分类改革对商业类国有企业经营绩效的影响研究  

Research on the Impact of Classification Reform on Business Performance of Commercial State-owned Enterprises under Profitability Orientation

作  者:袁晓玲[1] 王恒旭 赵锴[1] YUAN Xiaoling;WANG Hengxu;ZHAO Kai(School of Economics and Finance,Xi an Jiaotong University,Xi an 710061,China)

机构地区:[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061

出  处:《审计与经济研究》2025年第2期64-72,共9页Journal of Audit & Economics

基  金:教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(20JZD012);国家社会科学基金后期资助暨优秀博士论文项目(22FJYB008);国家社会科学基金青年项目(23CTJ008)。

摘  要:选取2008—2020年沪深A股上市公司的面板数据,采用双重差分模型剖析分类改革政策对商业类国有企业经营绩效的影响效果及作用机制,并进一步基于外部环境与企业属性的差异性进行验证。研究结果表明:分类改革政策显著提高了商业类国有企业的经营绩效;分类改革政策通过减轻政策性负担、降低委托代理成本、提升混合所有制程度等提升了商业类国有企业的经营绩效;从外部环境来看,相较于内陆地区,分类改革对沿海地区商业类国企经营绩效的提升作用更大;从企业属性来看,相较于特定功能类国企和地方国企,分类改革对商业竞争类国企和中央国企经营绩效的提升作用更大。Taking the relevant data of listed companies from 2008 to 2020 as a sample,the article examines the impact of classification reform on the business performance of commercial state-owned enterprises by means of a double-difference model.The study found that the classification reform significantly improved the business performance of commercial state-owned enterprises.It contributes to the business performance of commercial state-owned enterprises by weakening policy burdens,reducing principal-agent costs and enhancing the degree of mixed ownership.In terms of the external environment,the classification reform has a stronger effect on the business performance of commercial state-owned enterprises in coastal areas than that in inland areas.And in terms of enterprise attributes,the classification reform has a stronger effect on the business performance of commercially competitive state-owned enterprises and central state-owned enterprises than that of function-specific state-owned enterprises and local state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词:分类改革 商业类国有企业 经营绩效 政策性负担 委托代理 混合所有制 

分 类 号:F272.5[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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