机构投资者“分心”对企业非效率投资的影响及其机理——基于2010—2023年沪深A股上市公司样本的考察  

The impact and mechanism of institutional investors’“distraction”on corporate inefficient investment—An empirical study based on a sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets(2010-2023)

作　　者：王星月 汪涛 冯巧根[1] WANG Xingyue;WANG Tao;FENG Qiaogen(Business School,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China)

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版)》2025年第2期60-71,共12页Journal of Hunan Agricultural University(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(71732002);江苏省社会科学应用研究精品工程课题(21SYC-028)。

摘　　要：基于有限关注理论,以2010—2023年沪深A股上市公司为样本,考察了机构投资者因注意力分配差异而产生的“分心”现象对企业非效率投资的影响及作用机理。研究发现,机构投资者“分心”显著加剧了企业非效率投资,且主要表现在过度投资方面。机制检验表明,机构投资者“分心”加剧了代理冲突和信息不对称,从而导致企业投资效率的恶化。进一步分析发现,机构投资者“分心”对于企业非效率投资的影响在专注型机构投资者、管理层权力更大以及分析师关注和媒体关注较弱的样本中显著。Based on the limited attention theory and using a sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2010 to 2023,this study examines the impact and underlying mechanisms of institutional investors’“distraction”caused by differences in attention allocation on corporate inefficient investment.The findings show that institutional investors’“distraction”significantly exacerbates corporate inefficient investment,primarily in the form of over-investment.Mechanism analysis reveals that such distraction intensifies agency conflicts and information asymmetry,leading to a deterioration in investment efficiency.Further analysis indicates that the effect of institutional investors’distraction on inefficient investment is more pronounced in samples with dedicated institutional investors,greater managerial power,and weaker analyst and media coverage.

关 键 词：机构投资者 有限关注 代理问题 非效率投资 企业 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理] F276.6[经济管理—国民经济]