上级审计机关代行监事会职责抑制国有企业盈余管理了吗  

Does the Exercise of the Supervisory Board,s Duties by the Superior Auditing Authority Suppress the Earnings Management of SOEs?

作　　者：王素梅[1] 朱保 Wang Sumei;Zhu Bao

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学社会审计学院,211815

出　　处：《会计研究》2024年第12期135-149,共15页Accounting Research

摘　　要：自2018年以来,派驻监督成为我国政府审计机关监督国有企业的新型方式之一。本文运用广东省审计厅派驻省管企业审计专员制度实施这一准自然实验,从盈余管理视角,探讨上级审计机关代行监事会职责对国有企业的公司治理效应。研究发现:上级审计机关代行监事会职责可以显著抑制国有企业的应计盈余管理行为。机制检验发现,上级审计机关代行监事会职责可以缩小国企监督盲区、推动监督向下延伸,强化财务监督能力、抑制财务违规行为,进而抑制国有企业盈余管理程度。协同效应研究表明,上级审计机关代行监事会职责可以增强政府审计不定期监督和社会审计对盈余管理的抑制效果,有利于发挥国有企业内部监督机构与外部审计主体的治理协同效应。Since 2018,dispatching supervision has become one of the new ways for Chinese government audit agencies to supervise state-owned en⁃terprises.This paper explores the corporate governance effects of the superior audit agencies acting on behalf of the supervisory board on state-owned enter⁃prises from the perspective of earnings management.Research finds that the superior audit agency acting on behalf of the supervisory board can significantly suppress the accrual earnings management behavior of state-owned enterprises.Mechanism test shows that higher audit institutions can narrow the blind spot of supervision of state-owned enterprises,promote the downward extension of supervision,strengthen the ability of financial supervision,promote the exposure of earnings management behavior,and then restrain the degree of earnings management of state-owned enterprises.Results of synergy analysis show that the superior audit agency acting on behalf of the supervisory board can enhance the inhibitory effect of government and social audits on earnings management,and is conducive to leveraging the governance synergy effect between internal supervision agencies and external audit entities in state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：上级审计机关 监事会 盈余管理 国有企业 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F276.1[经济管理—国民经济] F239.4