政策风险化解与地方混改企业政企关系的差异化  

Policy Risk Mitigation and the Differentiation of Government-Enterprise Relationships in Local Mixed-Ownership Enterprises

作　　者：黄冬娅[1] 孟凯旋 Huang Dongya;Meng Kaixuan

机构地区：[1]中山大学政治与公共事务管理学院

出　　处：《江苏社会科学》2025年第2期73-81,I0003,共10页Jiangsu Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“优化民营经济发展环境、构建亲清政商关系研究”(21ZDA041)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：党的十八大以来,国企混合所有制改革有序推进,国家在不同混改企业中扮演了不同角色,国家与不同混改企业的关系是否存在差异以及为何存在差异成为重要的研究议题。不仅不同的行业市场竞争度与企业产权结构会导致国家与混改企业关系的差异,而且,在行业市场竞争度和企业产权结构相同的情况下,国家与地方混改企业的关系仍然存在不同类型,即间接市场调节型和直接市场调节型。在间接市场调节下,国家借助强制度嵌入对混改企业施加影响,建立起对混改企业的直接领导和管理;在直接市场调节下,国家对混改企业层层授权,实施“差异化管控”,让民营资本在治理权力结构和日常经营活动中有更大的自主权。这两种不同的类型并非根源于市场化环境或者地方政府的政策偏好,而是国企集团面临的政策风险差异所致。当国企集团能够有效化解混改政策风险时,它更倾向于采用直接市场调节型关系模式,激发混改企业市场活力;反之,当国企集团无法有效化解混改政策风险时,它更倾向于采用间接市场调节型关系模式,强化对混改企业的管控。通过有效的制度安排化解政策风险对于混合所有制改革的有序推进具有重要意义。Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,the reform of mixed ownership in stateowned enterprises(SOEs)has progressed in an orderly manner,with the state assuming varying roles across different mixed-ownership enterprises.This raises significant research questions:Do differences exist in the relationships between the state and various mixed-ownership enterprises,and if so,what accounts for these differences?Not only do variations in industry market competitiveness and enterprise ownership structures contribute to differences in the state's relationships with mixed-ownership enterprises,but even when industry market competitiveness and ownership structures are identical,distinct types of relationships between the state and local mixed-ownership enterprises persist—namely,indirect market regulation and direct market regulation.Under indirect market regulation,the state exerts influence over mixed-ownership enterprises through strong institutional embedding,resembling the traditional relationship between the state and SOEs,thereby establishing direct leadership and management over these enterprises.In contrast,under direct market regulation,the state delegates authority layer by layer to mixed-ownership enterprises,implementing"differentiated control"that grants private capital greater autonomy in governance structures and daily operational activities.These two distinct types of relationships do not stem from the market environment or the policy preferences of local governments but rather from differences in the policy risks faced by SOE groups.When an SOE group can effectively mitigate policy risks associated with mixed-ownership reform,it tends to adopt a direct market regulation model,invigorating the market vitality of mixed-ownership enterprises.Conversely,when an SOE group is unable to effectively address these policy risks,it is more inclined to adopt an indirect market regulation model,strengthening control over mixed-ownership enterprises.Effectively resolving policy risks through s

关 键 词：政企关系 混合所有制改革 混合所有制企业 国企改革 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]