基于供应商的供应可靠性投资与成本分摊决策  

Supplier-based Investment and Cost-sharing Decisions for Supply Reliability

作　　者：周晓宇 Xiaoyu Zhou(School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing,Jiangsu 210000)

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210000

出　　处：《经济发展研究(香港)》2025年第1期12-14,共3页

摘　　要：为保证供应链中的上游供应商供应可靠,许多研究聚焦于多源采购,但在垄断供应商主导的供应链中此方法不可行。对于内生变量导致的供应中断,供应商可投资于自身来提高可靠性。本文研究单供应商——单采购商的二级供应链中,供应商的供应可靠投资决策、产品批发价格决策,零售商的投资成本分摊决策、产品销售价格决策。为引导零售商分摊投资成本,供应商将投资是否成功的信息保密。分别在信息对称下建立供应商和零售商先后决策的斯坦克伯格博弈、在信息不对称下建立供应商和零售商的信号博弈模型。结果表明,当市场产品需求量大、投资成功率高时,供应商将进行供应可靠性投资,此时零售商分摊投资成本的意愿强烈。在投资成本分摊下,供应商的利润总会大于信号博弈下的供应商利润。当零售商不分摊投资成本时,混同均衡会成为信号博弈最可能的均衡结果。基于此,供应商可根据市场需求和投资成功率来考虑是否投资,零售商在投资分摊系数合理的情况下愿意共摊成本。To ensure the supply reliability of upstream suppliers in a supply chain,many studies have focused on multi-sourcing,but this approach is not feasible in supply chains dominated by monopoly suppliers.For supply disruptions caused by endogenous variables,suppliprice decision,ers can invest in themselves to improve reliability.In this paper,we study the supplier's supply reliability investment decision and wholesale and the retailer's investment cost-sharing decision and selling price decision in a single-supplier-single-buyer secondary supply chain.To guide the retailer to share the investment cost,the supplier keeps the information about whether the investment is successful or not confidential.The Stankenberg game of sequential decision-making between suppliers and retailers is modeled under information symmetry,and the signaling game between suppliers and retailers is modeled under information asymmetry,respectively.The results show that when the market demand for the product is high and the investment success rate is high,the supplier will invest in supply reliability,and then the retailer has a strong willingness to share the investment cost.Under the investment cost sharing,the supplier's profit will always be greater than the supplier's profit under the signaling game.When the retailer does not share the investment cost,the mixed equilibrium will be the most likely equilibrium outcome of the signaling game.Based on this,suppliers can consider whether to invest or not based on market demand and investment success rate,and retailers are willing to share the cost when the investment sharing coefficient is reasonable.

关 键 词：供应链 供应可靠 信号博弈 成本分摊 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]