高管激励与企业创新质量——基于媒体关注的调节效应  

Executive Incentives and the Quality of Corporate Innovation:Based on the Media Attention of the Moderation Effect

作　　者：郝妍 张春梅 Hao Yan;Zhang Chunmei(School of Business,Xi'an University of Finance and Economics,Xi'an Shanxi 710100,China)

机构地区：[1]西安财经大学商学院,陕西西安710100

出　　处：《科技创业月刊》2025年第3期36-43,共8页Journal of Entrepreneurship in Science & Technology

摘　　要：高管激励作为公司治理结构的核心组成部分,不仅影响高管的个人行为和决策,还间接作用于企业的创新活动和创新质量。基于2012-2022年全部A股上市公司的样本数据,运用面板回归模型实证检验高管激励对企业创新质量的影响,采用中介效应模型和调节效应模型实证分析了风险承担、融资约束以及媒体关注在高管激励与企业创新质量之间发挥的作用。研究发现,高管薪酬激励和股权激励显著提升了企业创新质量;风险承担和融资约束发挥了中介作用;媒体关注发挥了调节作用。进一步使用滞后一期进行稳健性检验后,研究结论依然成立。通过深入研究这些因素的作用机制和相互影响关系,可以为企业制定合理的高管激励策略、促进企业创新提供理论支持和实践指导。Executive incentives,as a core component of corporate governance structure,not only affect the personal behavior and decision-making of executives,but also indirectly impact the innovation activities and quality of the enterprise.Based on sample data of all A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2022,this study uses panel regression model to empirically test the impact of executive incentives on corporate innovation quality.The mediating effect model and moderation effect model are used to empirically analyze the roles of risk-taking,financing constraints,and media attention in the relationship between executive incentives and corporate innovation quality.Research has found that executive compensation incentives and equity incentives significantly improve the quality of corporate innovation;Risk taking and financing constraints play an intermediary role;Media attention played a moderating role.After further conducting robustness tests with a lag of one period,the research conclusion still holds true.By delving into the mechanisms and interrelationships of these factors,theoretical support and practical guidance can be provided for companies to develop reasonable executive incentive strategies and promote innovation.

关 键 词：高管激励 创新质量 风险承担 融资约束 媒体关注 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F273.1[经济管理—国民经济]