基于CSR的资金约束供应链信号传递策略  

Signaling Strategy of Supply Chain under Capital Constraints based on Corporate Social Responsibility(CSR)

作　　者：陈兆波 王舒婷[2] CHEN Zhaobo;WANG Shuting(Taiyuan University of Science and Technology Equipment Manufacturing Innovation Development Research Center,Taiyuan 030024,China;School of Economics and Management,Taiyuan University of Science and Technology,Taiyuan 030024,China)

机构地区：[1]太原科技大学装备制造业创新发展研究中心,山西太原030024 [2]太原科技大学经济与管理学院,山西太原030024

出　　处：《物流科技》2025年第7期110-116,157,共8页Logistics Sci Tech

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(19GBL259);太原科技大学研究生教育创新项目(SY2022069)。

摘　　要：信息不对称是导致中小型企业融资难的重要原因。在产品质量信息不对称下,以CSR行为作为信号,利用信号博弈的方法,分别研究了资金约束供应商的分离均衡和混同均衡。结果表明:供应商能够通过CSR行为向银行和零售商传递私人质量信息,并且供应商占优均衡策略与产品的批发价格和生产成本密切相关。当生产成本和批发价格之间比值较小时,供应商的占优策略为混同均衡;当生产成本和批发价格之间比值适中时,供应商的占优策略为有成本的分离均衡;当生产成本和批发价格之间比值较大时,供应商的占优策略为无成本的分离均衡。Information asymmetry is a significant factor contributing to the financing challenges faced by small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs).This study examines the separation equilibrium and mixed equilibrium of financially constrained suppliers in the context of asymmetric information regarding product quality,utilizing corporate social responsibility(CSR)behavior as a signaling mechanism through signal game analysis.The findings demonstrate that suppliers can effectively transmit private quality information to banks and retailers through CSR behavior,with their dominant equilibrium strategy closely linked to wholesale prices and production costs.Specifically,when the ratio between production cost and wholesale price is low,the supplier's dominant strategy exhibits a mixed equilibrium.Conversely,when this ratio is moderate,the supplier's dominant strategy shifts towards a separation equilibrium incorporating costs.Finally,in cases where the ratio between production cost and wholesale price is high,the supplier's dominant strategy evolves into a cost-free separation equilibrium.

关 键 词：资金约束供应链 企业社会责任 信息不对称 混同均衡 分离均衡 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]