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作 者:吴正祥 秦宝刚 WU Zhengxiang;QIN Baogang(School of Business Administration,Liaoning Technical University,Huludao 125105,China)
机构地区:[1]辽宁工程技术大学工商管理学院,辽宁葫芦岛125105
出 处:《物流科技》2025年第7期123-128,共6页Logistics Sci Tech
基 金:辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目“‘双碳’目标下制造业企业数字化治理与绿色发展协同优化研究”(L23BGL019)。
摘 要:文章以一个绿色制造商和一个零售商组成的绿色供应链为研究对象,构建有无消费者补贴下零售商未承担与承担CSR的四种博弈模型,研究消费者补贴与零售商CSR行为对绿色供应链决策的影响。研究表明:消费者补贴情形下零售商承担CSR将减缓产品销售价格和零售商利润的增幅,增强其余均衡结果的增幅;当零售商在消费者补贴情形下承担CSR时,只有自身CSR水平小于一定阈值时,其自身利润的增幅大于制造商利润,否则相反;零售商承担CSR情形下消费者补贴将促使零售商大幅降低自身利润,并增加制造商利润和绿色供应链系统利润。This study focuses on a green supply chain consisting of a green manufacturer and a retailer,and develops four game models to investigate the impact of consumer subsidies and retailers'CSR behavior on the decision-making process within the green supply chain.The findings indicate that:In the presence of consumer subsidies,retailers'engagement in CSR activities slows down the increase in product sales price and retailer's profit,while promoting overall equilibrium outcomes;when retailers undertake CSR under consumer subsidies,their own profit increase surpasses that of the manufacturer only if their CSR level remains below a certain threshold;otherwise,the opposite holds true;furthermore,under consumer subsidies,retailers'adoption of CSR leads to significant reduction in their own profit but increases profits for both manufacturers and the entire green supply chain system.
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