意识载体外部论与动态载体  

The Externalism of the Vehicle of Consciousness and Dynamic Vehicles

作　　者：刘林 LIU Lin(Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)

机构地区：[1]北京大学哲学与宗教学系,北京100871

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2025年第2期21-27,共7页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

摘　　要：意识载体外部论者主张意识经验的载体不仅是脑还包括身体或外部世界。这一立场的代表诺伊基于知觉经验和行动之间的密切关联为外部论辩护,而批评者指责诺伊混淆了因果和构成。这种批评假定了瞬时性构成,而诺伊却认为知觉经验需要时间中延展的动态载体。载体-内容时间同构和瞬时性随附是支持瞬时性构成的两个理由,但两者都面临挑战。但另一方面,基于动态载体的外部论所面临的一个问题是它原则上无法指出一种能够独立于脑而被界定的外部要素。The externalism of the vehicle of conscious experience claims that the vehicle of conscious experience en⁃compasses not only the brain but also bodies and the external world.Noë,the main proponent of this position,de⁃fends the externalism by highlighting the close connection between perception and action.The main criticism of this is that Noëconflates causation and constitution.The key assumption underlying this criticism is the notion of the in⁃stantaneous vehicle-experience relationship.In contrast,Noëargues that perception requires dynamic vehicles that extend through time.The vehicle-content temporal isomorphism and the instantaneous supervenience are two possible reasons in favor of the instantaneous relationship,which I argue are not justified.However,Noë’s exter⁃nalism based on dynamic vehicles still faces problems because it cannot point out an external element that can be defined independently of the brain.

关 键 词：意识载体外部论 动态载体 随附性 因果-构成谬误 瞬时性构成 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]