基于演化博弈的制造业企业智能化升级动力系统研究  

Research on Intelligent Upgrading Power System of Manufacturing Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：张燕[1] 史永乐 韩江波[3] ZHANG Yan;SHI Yongle;HAN Jiangbo

机构地区：[1]广东科学技术职业学院,广州510640 [2]南阳理工学院,南阳473004 [3]南阳师范学院,南阳473001

出　　处：《上海市经济管理干部学院学报》2025年第2期2-22,共21页Journal of Shanghai Economic Management College

基　　金：广东省哲学社会科学规划2024年度学科共建项目“数字经济背景下广东制造业企业智能化升级动力系统研究”(GD24XYJ21);广州市哲学社会科学发展“十四五”规划2024年度共建课题“数字经济赋能广州制造业转型升级的路径研究:基于‘技术—经济范式’演化的视角”(2024GZGJ143);河南省哲学社会科学项目“河南专精特新企业数字化转型的动力机制与实现路径研究”(2023BJJ069);河南省哲学社会科学规划项目“河南以新质生产力推动制造业高质量发展研究”(2024BJJ204);河南省高等学校重点科研项目计划“河南以新质生产力推动经济高质量发展的路径研究”(25A790010)。

摘　　要：运用演化博弈及Matlab仿真分析方法,构建制造业企业、政府、市场三方非对称动态演化博弈模型,分析制约制造业企业智能化升级的因素,通过研究博弈主体的相互关系,并模拟三方行为决策演化路径,验证了制造业企业智能化升级是由多种主体相互作用、相互影响、相互制约的动态演进过程。研究表明:博弈主体的决策与制造业企业智能化升级的收益和成本、政府的罚款与补贴以及智能化产品与传统产品为市场带来的效用等关键参数有关,且关键参数取不同数值时会对主体向稳定策略演化的方向、速率及路径产生影响。By using evolutionary game and Matlab simulation analysis methods,this paper builds an asymmetric dynamic evolutionary game model of manufacturing enterprises,governments and markets,analyzes the factors restricting the intelligent upgrading of manufacturing enterprises,studies the relationship between game players,and simulates the evolution path of tripartite behavior decision-making.It is verified that the intelligent upgrading of manufacturing enterprises is a dynamic evolution process of interaction,mutual influence and mutual restriction of various subjects.The research shows that the decision-making of game players is related to key parameters such as the benefits and costs of intelligent upgrading of manufacturing enterprises,government fines and subsidies,and the utility of intelligent products and traditional products to the market,and different values of key parameters will have an impact on the direction,rate and path of the evolution of players to a stable strategy.

关 键 词：制造业企业 政府 市场 智能化 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]