制造商主导下供应链信息策略及减排激励研究  

Research on supply chain information strategy and emission reduction incentive under manufacturer-led conditions

作　　者：王晓锋[1] 肖莉莉 王梦玲 WANG Xiaofeng;XIAO Lili;WANG Mengling(Glorious Sun School of Business and Management,Donghua University,Shanghai,China)

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海

出　　处：《东华大学学报(自然科学版)》2025年第1期170-180,共11页Journal of Donghua University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71832001,71871052)。

摘　　要：在碳税环境下,针对制造商可能谎报私有减排信息及零售商隐瞒私有需求信息的行为,构建4种不同场景下的纺织服装供应链决策模型,这些模型均基于双向信息不对称假设,研究旨在探讨制造商的减排信息披露策略和零售商的需求信息共享策略,并提出促进减排的激励契约。结果表明:作为供应链的主导者,制造商在无减排谎报动机下表现稳定;零售商在预测市场的高需求状态下缺乏信息共享意愿,但市场低需求状态下,其信息共享的决策受到预测精度显著影响。通过引入基于数量折扣的减排激励契约,成功激励零售商共享其市场预测信息,此举不仅促进了供应链利润的增长,还实现了减排量的提升。值得注意的是,随着预测精度的提高,供应链利润增幅也呈现增长趋势。In the realm of carbon taxation,considering the misrepresentation of manufacturers’private emission reduction information and the concealing of retailers’private demand information,a textile and garment supply chain decision-making model in four scenarios under two-way information asymmetry is constructed and the emssion reduction in centive contracts are propsed.The model is used to explore manufacturers’emission reduction information disclosure and retailers’demand information sharing strategies.The results show that manufacturers,as the dominant players in the supply chain,have no incentive to lie about emissions reduction.Retailers have no motivation to share information when the market state is high,and the sharing is affected by the prediction accuracy when the market state is low.The emission reduction incentive contract based on quantity discount can encourage retailers to share their market forecasts,which not only increase supply chain profits,but also achieve higher emission reductions.It is worth noting that with the improvement of forecast accuracy,the profits growth of the supply chain also shows an increasing trend.

关 键 词：信息不对称 减排谎报 信息共享 减排激励契约 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]