不完全契约条件下新乡贤激励约束机制的制度性建构——基于皖西华县“能人回归工程”的个案研究  

The Institutional Construction of the New Gentry’s Incentive and Restrictive Mechanism under Incomplete Contract A case study based on the“Talent Return Project”in Hua County,Anhui Province

作　　者：陈寒非[1] Chen Hanfei

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学法学院

出　　处：《民间法》2024年第3期222-236,共15页

基　　金：北京市社会科学基金青年项目“新时代北京乡村治理法治化的路径优化研究”(编号:22FXC017)

摘　　要：新乡贤是乡村治理的重要人才支撑,对乡村治理起到关键性的推动作用。由于新乡贤治村存在偏离乡村治理目标的风险,因此需要通过构建激励约束机制对其进行培育和监管。皖西华县与新乡贤签订的《“能人回归工程”协议》属于公私合作模式下的不完全激励合约。从TCE框架下不完全契约理论出发,新乡贤组织介于官僚制组织和市场化组织之间,其激励强度、激励偏差以及约束程度属于中等强度。政府基于不完全契约制度性建构出政治激励、经济激励、政策激励、文化激励等多元激励机制,以及摸排建档、责任设定、监督考核等责任约束机制,在提升激励强度的同时尽可能降低激励偏差,使新乡贤的行动方向不偏离组织目标方向。政府通过不完全契约设计尽可能地掌握剩余控制权,而这也为其灵活运用激励约束机制提供了极具弹性的制度基础。The new gentry is an important talent support for rural governance and plays a key role in promoting rural governance.Since there is a risk of deviating from the goals of rural governance in villages governed by gentry,it is necessary to cultivate and supervise them by building an incentive and restraint mechanism.The“talent return project”agreement signed by Hua County and the new gentry is an incomplete incentive contract.Starting from the incomplete contract theory under the TCE framework,the Xinxiang Xian organization is between the bureaucratic organization and the market-oriented organization,and its incentive intensity,incentive deviation and degree of restraint are moderate.Hua County has built multiple incentive mechanisms such as political incentives,economic incentives,policy incentives,and cultural incentives,as well as responsibility restraint mechanisms such as scouting and filing,responsibility setting,and supervision and assessment.The direction of action does not deviate from the direction of the organization's goals.

关 键 词：新乡贤 能人回归工程 不完全契约 多元激励 责任约束 

分 类 号：D422.6[政治法律—政治学] C964.2[政治法律—国际共产主义运动]