高管薪酬激励与全要素生产率——基于管理者风险偏好的调节作用  

Executive Compensation Incentives and Total Factor Productivity--The Moderating Effect Based on Managers’Risk Preferences

作　　者：俞诗音 左晶晶[1] Shiyin Yu;Jingjing Zuo(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海

出　　处：《运筹与模糊学》2025年第1期470-481,共12页Operations Research and Fuzziology

摘　　要：本文选取2012年至2023年间沪深A股上市公司作为研究样本,通过实证分析探究高管薪酬激励机制对企业全要素生产率(Total Factor Productivity,TFP)的影响,并进一步考察管理者风险偏好在其中是否发挥调节作用。研究结果显示:高管薪酬激励与企业全要素生产率显著正相关;同时,管理者风险偏好对高管薪酬激励提升企业全要素生产率的正向效应起到了负向调节作用。本文基于高管认知视角,为企业构建科学合理的高管薪酬激励体系提供了理论依据与实践指导。This article selects A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2023 as research samples,and conducts empirical analysis to explore the impact of executive compensation incentive mechanism on total factor productivity(TFP)of enterprises,and further examines whether managerial risk preference plays a moderating role in it.The research results show that executive compensation incentives are significantly positively correlated with total factor productivity of enterprises;at the same time,the risk preference of managers has a negative moderating effect on the positive effect of executive compensation incentives on improving the total factor productivity of enterprises.This article provides theoretical basis and practical guidance for enterprises to construct a scientific and reasonable executive compensation incentive system based on the perspective of executive cognition.

关 键 词：高管激励 全要素生产率 管理者风险偏好 委托代理理论 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]