高管超额薪酬、机构投资者持股与审计费用  

Excessive Executive Compensation,Institutional Investors'Shareholding and Audit Fees

作　　者：朱睿姝 万小龙 ZHU Ruishu;WAN Xiaoong(School of Management Engineering and Business,Heibei University of Engineering,Handan 056038,China)

机构地区：[1]河北工程大学管理工程与商学院,河北邯郸056038

出　　处：《商业观察》2025年第9期29-34,共6页BUSINESS OBSERVATION

摘　　要：基于信息不对称理论,被审计单位与会计师事务所间存在严重的信息差距,使得审计收费成为被审计单位与会计师事务所双方力量博弈的结果。高管作为被审计单位日常经营管理的实际执行者,尚未有证据明确表明其获取的超额薪酬与审计师的审计定价之间存在关联。文章以2014—2023年这十年间全部A股上市公司为研究样本,运用统计学方法实证检验高管超额薪酬与审计费用之间的关系。研究结果表明,上市公司高管所获得的超额薪酬将导致企业审计费用的增加。同时,在机构投资者参与公司治理后,随着机构投资者持股比例的增加,将显著抑制高管超额薪酬与审计费用的正相关关系。Based on the theory of information asymmetry,due to the serious information gap between the audited entity and the accounting firm,audit fees become the result of a power game between the audited entity and the accounting firm.Executives are the actual executors of the daily operation and management of the audited entity,and there is no clear evidence to suggest a correlation between the excess compensation received by executives and the audit pricing of auditors.The article takes all A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2023 as the research samples,and uses statistical methods to empirically test the relationship between excessive executive compensation and audit fees.The research results indicate that the excessive compensation received by executives of listed companies will lead to an increase in audit fees.Meanwhile,as institutional investors participate in corporate governance,the increase in their shareholding ratio will significantly suppress the positive correlation between excessive executive compensation and audit fees.

关 键 词：高管超额薪酬 审计费用 机构投资者持股 实证研究 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]