理性还是无奈:有限合伙协议架构企业的债务期限选择  

Rational or Helpless:Debt Maturity Choices in Limited Partnership Enterprises

作　　者：陈美茜 魏志华[1] 林沛沛 CHEN Mei-xi;WEI Zhi-hua;LIN Pei-pei(School of Economics,Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005;Graduate Institute for Taiwan Studies,Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,China)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学经济学院,福建厦门361005 [2]厦门大学台湾研究院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2025年第3期112-126,共15页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金专项项目(72442004);国家自然科学基金面上项目(72472131、71972163);福建省社会科学基金一般项目(FJ2024B017)。

摘　　要：基于债务期限的代理成本理论和信息不对称理论,利用我国2014—2021年在沪深A股上市的非国有企业数据实证检验有限合伙协议架构(LP架构)对企业债务期限选择的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,相较于非LP架构企业,LP架构企业的债务期限显著缩短,且这一效应在代理成本更高、信息不对称程度更大的企业中更加显著。异质性分析发现,在企业治理水平低、实际控制人担任经理人、融资约束程度高的企业中,LP架构对债务期限的负向影响更加显著。进一步地,LP架构引致的债务短期化提高了企业债务融资成本,说明LP架构企业缩短债务期限的行为是被迫无奈的选择。Based on data from China's A-share listed non-state-owned enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2014 to2021, this paper empirically examined the impact of the limited partnership agreement structure(LP structure) on corporate debt maturity selection and its underlying mechanisms based on the agency cost theory and information asymmetry theory of debt maturity.The findings revealed that, compared to non-LP structure, the debt maturity of LP structured enterprises was significantly shorter, and this effect was more pronounced in enterprises with higher agency costs and greater information asymmetry. Heterogeneity analysis showed that the LP structure had a more significant negative impact on debt maturity in enterprises with lower governance levels,actual controller acting as managers, and higher degrees of financing constraints. Furthermore, the debt short-termism caused by the LP structure increased corporate debt financing costs, indicating that the decision of LP-structured enterprises to shorten debt maturity was a forced choice rather than an optimal strategy.

关 键 词：有限合伙协议架构 新兴股权架构设计 债务融资 债务期限结构 债权人 代理冲突 信息不对称 短期债务治理 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]