非国有股东治理与国有企业去影子银行化--基于混合所有制改革的背景  

Non-state Shareholders'Governance and De-shadow-banking of State-owned Enterprises:Based on the Background of Mixed Ownership Reform

作　　者：胡玥 马新啸 HU Yue;MA Xin-xiao(School of Finance,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China;Management College,Ocean University of China,Qingdao 266100,China)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学金融学院,江苏南京211815 [2]中国海洋大学管理学院,山东青岛266100

出　　处：《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》2025年第4期114-129,共16页Modern Finance and Economics:Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(72302224);山东省自然科学基金青年项目(ZR2024QG094)。

摘　　要：国有企业平稳健康经营是防范系统性金融风险和实现经济社会高质量发展的重要基础,引导国有企业“脱虚向实”是增强国有经济抗风险能力的关键。基于混合所有制改革的背景,本文研究非国有股东治理对国有企业影子银行化的影响机理。使用2008-2021年国有上市公司数据作为样本,研究发现:(1)非国有股东参与治理能够降低国有企业的影子银行化程度。(2)机制检验表明,非国有股东治理通过缓解预算软约束、改善实体经营能力、优化高管长期激励机制来实现上述效果。(3)异质性检验表明,上述成效在法治环境较差地区、东部地区,行业竞争激烈、内部现金流充裕、资产规模较小的国有企业中更加突出,且战略型非国有股东的治理效果更好。(4)经济后果检验表明,在非国有股东治理作用下,国有企业的经营风险和金融错配程度明显下降。本文研究表明非国有股东治理有助于实现国有企业去影子银行化的积极作用,为以市场化手段增强国有经济抗风险能力提供新思路。The stable and healthy operation of state-owned enterprises is an important foundation for preventing systemic financial risks and achieving high-quality economic and social development.Guiding state-owned enterprises to“move from virtual to real”is the key to enhancing the risk resistance of the state-owned economy.Under the background of mixed ownership reform,this paper studies the impact mechanism of non-state shareholders'governance on the shadow banking of state-owned enterprises.Using the state-owned listed companies'data from 2008 to 2021 as a sample,it is found that:(1)Non-state shareholders'participation in governance can reduce the degree of shadow banking in state-owned enterprises.(2)Mechanism tests show that non-state shareholders'governance achieves the above effects by easing soft budget constraints,improving entity operating capabilities,and optimizing long-term incentive mechanisms for senior executives.(3)Heterogeneity tests show that the above effects are more prominent in state-owned enterprises with poor legal environment,eastern regions,fierce industry competition,abundant internal cash flow,and small asset scale.The strategic non-state shareholders have better governance effects.(4)Economic consequence tests show that under the governance of non-state shareholders,the operating risks and financial mismatch of state-owned enterprises have been significantly reduced.This paper shows that non-state shareholders'governance can help realize the positive effect of de-shadow-banking of state-owned enterprises,and provide new ideas for enhancing the risk resistance of the state-owned economy through market-oriented mechanisms.

关 键 词：国有企业 影子银行 混合所有制改革 非国有股东治理 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]