意志与决断:《存在与时间》意向性与意志论的难题  

The Will and Resolution:The Problem of Intentionality and Voluntarism in Being and Time

作　　者：毛竹[1,2] Mao Zhu

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院大学哲学系,北京100732 [2]中国社会科学院哲学研究所《世界哲学》编辑部

出　　处：《浙江学刊》2025年第2期164-172,240,共10页Zhejiang Academic Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金西部项目“海德格尔的历史性思想研究”(24XZX008)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：海德格尔在《存在与时间》中只有一次着重提到“意向性”这个词。本文试图简要澄清海德格尔与传统意向性学说的关系,以及海德格尔建立在对“情绪”的生存论分析基础上的意向性学说。本文认为,胡塞尔早已看到海德格尔的意向性学说是对其自身开创性意向性学说的挪用;而对于海德格尔而言,其意向性学说有别于胡塞尔的意向性学说的地方,在于《存在与时间》中存在的“含糊的意志论”,这种意志论与意向性的关系在《现象学之基本问题》中得到了进一步的定义。最终,海德格尔饱受诟病的真理问题,其理论基础恰恰奠基其具有意志论倾向的意向性学说之上。It is wild acknowledged that Heidegger mentioned intentionality only once in Being and Time.This paper seeks to briefly clarify Heidegger’s relationship to traditional doctrines of intentional doctrine of intentional ity and Heidegger’s ity based on existential analyses of emotions,which Husserl had long seen as an appropriation of his own seminal doctrine of intentionality.This paper argues that,for Heidegger,what distinguishes his doctrine of intentionality from Husserl’s is the“ambiguous voluntarism”of Being and Time,a relationship between voluntarism and intentionality that is further defined in Heidegger’s The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.This paper argues that the theoretical foundation of Heidegger’s much-criticized ethical paradox lies precisely in this voluntarily transformed doctrine of intentionality.

关 键 词：意向性 意志 操心 现身情态 决断 

分 类 号：B516.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]