廉政建设能否提高创新补贴对企业专利的激励效应?  

Can Integrity Building Enhance the Incentive Effect of Innovation Subsidies on Corporate Patents?

作　　者：朱桂龙[1] 陈字理 欧阳芳 ZHU Guilong;CHEN Zili;OUYANG Fang(School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510640,China;School of Economics and Management,Guangdong Vocational and Technical College of Water Resources and Electric Power,Guangzhou 510925,China)

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广州510640 [2]广东水利电力职业技术学院经济管理学院,广州510925

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2025年第3期61-77,共17页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

基　　金：研究阐释党的二十大精神国家社会科学基金重大项目(23ZDA062)。

摘　　要：研究以中国沪深两市A股上市公司面板数据作为样本,基于数量与质量视角,探讨廉政建设能否提高创新补贴对企业专利的激励效应。研究结果显示:(1)创新补贴政策既能提高企业的专利数量,也能提高企业的专利质量。(2)廉政建设对创新补贴与专利数量、质量之间的关联性具有非对称性影响,即廉政建设力度加强显著降低了创新补贴与专利数量之间的正向关联性,但显著提高了创新补贴对专利质量的正向激励。(3)随着补贴集中度提高,廉政建设对创新补贴数量与质量维度上的非对称性影响进一步增强,表明廉政建设在高补贴集中度的情境下更能够缓解创新补贴所导致的专利泡沫现象。上述结论在经过多种稳健性检验后依然成立。(4)进一步的分析揭示了廉政建设提高创新补贴政策效应的作用机制:切断了企业获取创新补贴的寻租渠道,改变了受补贴企业的资源配置逻辑,实现由“重数量”向“重质量”的转变。Although there remains controversy among academic circles on whether innovation subsidy policies can truly motivate enterprise innovation,in reality,these policies have become a commonly used innovation incentive tool by the Chinese government.Naturally,scholars'research focus has shifted from"how effective are innovation subsidy policies"to"how to improve the policy effects of innovation subsidies".Rent-seeking issues during the implementation of subsidy policies are the primary concerns scholars have raised about these policies.Against the backdrop of ongoing advancements in corruption punishment and the controversial phenomenon of patent bubbles fueled by innovation subsidies in China,this study examines the panel data of A-share listed companies in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets.It explores whether corruption punishment can mitigate the"patent bubble"phenomenon caused by innovation subsidies and enhance their policy effects,from the perspectives of patent quantity and quality.The findings indicate:(1)Innovation subsidy policies can increase both the quantity and quality of patents for enterprises.(2)Corruption punishment has an asymmetric impact on the relationship between innovation subsidies and patent quantity/quality,specifically,intensified corruption punishment significantly reduces the positive correlation between innovation subsidies and patent quantity,but significantly enhances the positive incentive of innovation subsidies on patent quality.(3)As the concentration of subsidies increases,the asymmetric impact of corruption punishment on the quantity and quality dimensions of innovation subsidies further intensifies,suggesting that corruption punishment is more effective in mitigating patent bubbles caused by innovation subsidies in scenarios with high subsidy concentration.These conclusions remain valid after various robustness tests.(4)Further analysis reveals the mechanism of how corruption punishment enhances the policy effects of innovation subsidies:it cuts off rent-seeking channel

关 键 词：廉政建设 创新补贴 专利数量 专利质量 

分 类 号：C01[社会学] F273[经济管理—企业管理]