碳欺骗视角下能源企业碳信息披露的信号博弈模型  

Signaling Game Model of Energy FirmsCarbon Information Disclosure From the Perspective of Carbon Deception

作　　者：郝道青 宋民雪 李德龙 冷杰 刘肖肖 Hao Daoqing;Song Minxue;Li Delong;Leng Jie;Liu Xiaoxiao(School of Management Science and Engineering,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116021,China;School of Economics and Management,Dalian Minzu University,Dalian 116650,China;School of Business Administration,Inner Mongolia University of Finance and Economics,Hohhot 010070,China;College of International Tourism and Public Administration,Hainan University,Haikou 570228,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院,大连116021 [2]大连民族大学经济管理学院,大连116650 [3]内蒙古财经大学工商管理学院,呼和浩特010070 [4]海南大学国际旅游与公共管理学院,海口570228

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2025年第5期150-160,共11页Journal of Industrial Technology and Economy

基　　金：辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目“辽宁省制造业数字化转型的演化博弈分析及对策研究”(项目编号:L23CGL011);辽宁省经济社会发展研究课题“辽宁省制造业数字化转型演化机理及加快新质生产力形成对策研究”(项目编号:2025lslqnwzzkt-069)。

摘　　要：能源企业的技术选择影响社会经济发展质量,但碳排放权交易中存在碳信息披露造假问题。本文通过构建信号博弈模型,分析了政府与能源企业间的均衡策略选择,并运用直观标准验证了均衡策略的合理性。通过案例研究对政策惩罚和补贴措施进行了敏感性分析,揭示了均衡转换的内在机理。研究发现:适度的政府补贴能提升企业合规披露的可能性,但过高补贴反而降低政府对企业合规披露的信念;较大的惩罚力度降低了对企业造假概率变化的敏感度;当企业造假概率处于中等水平时,罚款导致的分离均衡未必优于混同均衡;当造假概率超过特定阈值,政府补贴会导致混同均衡,呈现政策边际效应递减特征。The technological choices of energy enterprises significantly impact socioeconomic development quality.However,fraudulent carbon information disclosure remains a concern in carbon emission trading.This study constructs a signaling game model to analyze the equilibrium strategy choices between government and energy enterprises,validating the equilibrium strategies through intuitive criteria.Through case studies,we conduct sensitivity analyses on policy penalties and subsidies to reveal the underlying mechanisms of equilibrium transitions.The findings indicate that moderate government subsidies can enhance the likelihood of compliant disclosure,while excessive subsidies paradoxically reduce government confidence in enterprisescompliance.Additionally,increased penalty intensity decreases sensitivity to changes in enterprisesprobability of fraudulent disclosure.When the probability of fraud falls within the intermediate range,separating equilibrium induced by government fines may not necessarily be more conducive to achieving compliant carbon information disclosure compared to pooling equilibrium.Furthermore,when the probability of fraud exceeds a certain threshold,government subsidies lead to pooling equilibrium,demonstrating diminishing marginal effects of policy interventions.

关 键 词：不同类型能源企业 碳排放权交易 碳信息披露 碳欺骗 新能源技术 不对称信息 政府规制 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]