论儒家人格尊严思想:基于权利视角的省思  

On the Confucian Personal Dignity:Based on the Perspective of Rights

作　　者：王辉 WANG Hui(Law School,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang,Jiangxi 330013,China)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学法学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《江西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2025年第2期154-160,共7页Journal of Jiangxi Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：江西省社会科学基金重点项目“持续优化我省法治化营商环境的政策保障与路径研究”(编号:24ZXQH04)。

摘　　要：儒家人格尊严思想一直是儒家权利思想研究的核心。儒家思想的原典中包含了丰富的人格尊严思想,如孔子“仁爱”“志”的思想;孟子“天爵”“良贵”说和“人为贵”说。儒家人格尊严思想具有伦理道德性、潜在性与现实性等主要特征。儒家人格尊严思想不能直接作为权利或者作为权利的哲学基础或基本预设,但可以成为发展中国人权有益的思想资源。The concept of personal dignity in Confucianism has always been a central theme in the study of Confucian rights.The original texts of Confucianism contain rich ideas on personal dignity,such as Confucius’concepts of“benevolence”and“aspiration”;Mencius’theories of“heavenly nobility”,“good and noble”,and“human beings are precious”.The Confucian personal dignity has such characteristics as ethics,morality,potential and reality,etc.The Confucian personal dignity cannot be directly used as rights or as the philosophical foundation or fundamental premise of rights.However,it can serve as valuable“intellectual resources”to Chinese human rights.

关 键 词：儒家思想 人格尊严 权利 

分 类 号：B22[哲学宗教—中国哲学]