论生成式AI的作者身份问题  

On the Authorship of Generative Artificial Intelligence

作　　者：成骁杰 Cheng Xiaojie(School of Marxism,Nanchang University Nanchang 330031,China)

机构地区：[1]南昌大学马克思主义学院

出　　处：《科学.经济.社会》2025年第1期65-76,共12页Science Economy Society

基　　金：江西省高校人文社会科学重点研究基地项目“大语言模型时代高校思想政治教育创新研究”(JD23004)。

摘　　要：生成式AI在知识生成和学术创作领域扮演着重要角色,其能否成为学术论文作者的问题,引起学界关注。拥护派承认生成式AI的作者身份,主张其可以成为学术创作和论文发表的主体。限制派否认其作者身份,主张人类应该在学术创作中限制甚至禁用生成式AI。本文认为限制派的结论在理由和后果两个方面均存在问题。在理由方面,限制派认为生成式AI不具备自由意志,因此无法对其发表的论文负责,进而没有资格成为论文作者。然而,自由意志本质上是一个指派问题,将自由意志指派给生成式AI有其合理性。此外,即便生成式AI不具备自由意志,我们依然可以基于目的论责任观使其对论文负责。在后果方面,作者身份禁令除难以执行外,还会引发冤假错案、起反作用等不良后果。因此,我们应该以开放的态度对待生成式AI的作者身份问题。Generative artificial intelligence plays an important role in the field of knowledge generation and academic creation,and the question of whether it can become the author of academic papers has attracted the attention of academic circles.Proponents recognize the authorship of generative AI and argue that it can be the subject of academic creation and publication.Restrictionists deny its authorship and argue that humans should limit or even ban generative AI in academic creation.This paper will argue that the restrictionist conclusions are problematic both in terms of reason and consequence.Restrictionists argue that a generative Al does not have free will and therefore cannot be responsible for the papers it publishes,and therefore does not qualify as an author.However,free will is something that we humans attribute to things,and it makes sense to attribute free will to generative Al.Moreover,even if generative Al does not have free will,we can still make it responsible for the paper based on the purposive view of responsibility.In terms of consequences,authorship prohibition is not only difficult to implement,but also leads to unjust,false and wrong cases and adverse consequences.Therefore,we should approach the question of authorship of generative AI with an open mind.

关 键 词：生成式AI 作者身份 自由意志指派论 目的论责任观 

分 类 号：B82-057[哲学宗教—伦理学]