运营资产托管服务模式的动态实现机制研究  

Study on the dynamic implementation mechanism of the operational asset management service model

作　　者：赵睿 罗建强[1,2] ZHAO Rui;LUO Jianqiang(School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China;China Institute for Agricultural Equipment Industry Development,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)

机构地区：[1]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013 [2]江苏大学中国农业装备产业发展研究院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《科技管理学报》2025年第1期63-74,共12页Journal of Science and Technology Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(23BGL004)。

摘　　要：在服务型制造模式的创新与实践过程中,龙头企业面临因前端增值性服务业务剧增而后端产能支持不足的问题。产业内涌现出了新型的服务型制造模式——运营资产托管服务模式。该模式通过整合中小型企业闲置产能,既可解决中小型企业产能过剩难题,又可弥补龙头企业因服务扩张而产生的产能缺口。本文通过研究该模式中龙头企业与中小型企业的动态实现机制,构建特殊委托代理框架下的利益分配模型,结合棘轮效应剖析两类企业之间的最优利益分配契约。研究发现:龙头企业依据最优利润分配比例动态调整努力程度,且其努力策略受棘轮效应驱动呈递增态势;中小型企业降低利润分配诉求可激励龙头企业提升努力程度,从而削弱棘轮效应的负面影响;龙头企业产品服务技术能力的稳定性与中小型企业运营资产质量的匹配是双方实现价值共创的前提条件。研究结果为服务型制造企业在主导与中小型企业合作时,设计价值共享机制与管理风险提供了理论依据。In the innovation and practice process of service-oriented manufacturing models,leading enterprises often encounter the challenge of insufficient back-end capacity support due to the rapid growth of front-end value-added service businesses.To address this issue,a new service-oriented manufacturing model-operational asset management service-has emerged,offering a viable solution that allows small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs)to mitigate overcapacity while enabling leading enterprises to bridge their production capacity gaps resulting from service expansion.By adopting this model,SMEs can optimize resource utilization,reduce operational risks,and gain access to advanced technological capabilities,while leading enterprises can extend their service coverage without significant investments in fixed assets,thereby enhancing overall industry efficiency.This study constructs a dynamic principal-agent model to examine the optimal benefit distribution contract between a leading enterprise and an SME within the operational asset management service framework.Through a rigorous theoretical analysis,the study investigates how dynamic incentives influence the effort levels of leading enterprises and how asymmetric information affects contractual efficiency.The findings indicate that the leading enterprise will strategically adjust its level of effort according to the optimal profit distribution ratio,ensuring incentive alignment between both parties.Moreover,under the influence of the ratchet effect,the optimal effort level of the leading enterprise increases over time,reflecting a dynamic trade-off between short-term profit-sharing and long-term strategic benefits.Furthermore,the study highlights the critical role of compatibility between the product service technological capabilities of the leading enterprise and the quality of the operational assets managed on behalf of SMEs.A misalignment in these factors may lead to inefficiencies,reduced profitability,and potential frictions in asset utilization.Therefore,the design

关 键 词：服务型制造模式 运营资产托管服务 委托代理 动态激励 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]