主体性与时间性的关系:梅洛-庞蒂的亲历性时间  

The Relationship between Subjectivity and Temporality:Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Lived Time

作　　者：王大桥[1] 冯乐群 WANG Da-qiao;FENG Le-qun(School of Literature,Lanzhou University,Lanzhou 730000,China)

机构地区：[1]兰州大学文学院,甘肃兰州730000

出　　处：《广西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2025年第3期156-166,共11页Journal of Guangxi Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目“当代批判理论的美学问题研究”(22BZW039)。

摘　　要：梅洛-庞蒂在胡塞尔、海德格尔以及萨特的时间概念基础上提出“亲历性时间”,推动了时间现象学的研究。不同于无主体的客观时间或自然时间,“亲历性时间”建立在自我与世界的关系之上,时间构成了主体实存的意义,而非客观世界之部分。身体进入世界的处境和视点决定了时间自身的结构,正是透过处于知觉场中的时间视点,过去、现在与未来的时间综合才得以实现。基于对主体知觉的重视,梅洛-庞蒂更加强调“现在”对于存在的重要性,当下的知觉情境汇聚了过去与未来,重构了处于世界之中的主体。Merleau-Ponty proposes the concept of“lived time”(temps vécu)based on Husserl,Heidegger,and Sartre’s notions of temporality,advancing the study of temporal phenomenology.Unlike subjectless objective or natural time,“lived time”is grounded in the relationship between the self and the world.Here,time constitutes the existential significance of the subject rather than serving as a component of the objective world.The structure of time itself emerges from the body’s situatedness within the world and its perceptual perspectives.It is precisely through these temporal viewpoints embedded in the perceptual field that the synthesis of past,present,and future is actualized.Emphasizing the primacy of subjective perception,Merleau-Ponty particularly highlights the ontological importance of the“now”.The present perceptual situation converges both past and future,thereby reconstructing the subject as an embodied being within the world.

关 键 词：主体性 时间性 梅洛-庞蒂 亲历性时间 知觉现象学 

分 类 号：B565.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]