混合所有制改革背景下国企如何应对制度逻辑冲突——基于金字塔结构的隔板式治理  

How Do State-owned Enterprises Respond to Institu-tional Logic Conflicts under Mixed-ownership Reform? Partitioned Governance Based on Pyramidal Structure

作　　者：陈光沛 魏江 杨升曦[4] 王青 Chen Guangpei;Wei Jiang;Yang Shengxi;Wang Qing(School of Economics and Management,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China;School of Management,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics;School of Management,Zhejiang University;Business School,Sichuan University;Warwick Business School,University of Warwick)

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院 [2]浙江财经大学管理学院 [3]浙江大学管理学院 [4]四川大学商学院 [5]华威大学商学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2025年第4期4-15,共12页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大项目(72091312);国家自然科学基金重点项目(71732008);国家社会科学基金重大项目(23&ZD131)资助。

摘　　要：混合所有制改革背景下,国有企业应如何应对不断加剧的制度逻辑冲突?如何在兼顾经济效益的同时提升政策绩效?为回答如上问题,本文通过对海康威视及其所在的视频安防行业开展案例分析,发现:(1)面对制度逻辑冲突,国企会选择与政府松散耦合的制度设计,向上设置“隔离带”,向下开凿“防水渠”,所形成的金字塔结构能够发挥“分层过滤器”作用,将行政逻辑与市场逻辑分离在不同的制度层级中。(2)金字塔结构的形成具有反复振荡的特征,该结构的最终稳定源于国企管理层持续创新组织安排的战略能动性,更离不开市场化改革背景下制度障碍被逐步扫清的环境条件。(3)金字塔结构本身只能分离却无法消解不同制度逻辑的张力,制度逻辑冲突的解决有赖于国企开展基于金字塔结构的隔板式治理,表现为双元领导下的资源桥接与冲突转移机制。(4)通过隔板式治理,国企能够在产业政策发展过程中发挥“试金石”与“信号枪”作用,基于风险承担与信息反馈机制,带头响应政策,并为政策试错提供反馈。这些发现有助于混合型组织、制度逻辑等研究,并对国企改革、产业政策发展等实践具有一定启示。The mixed-ownership reform,which facilitates the entry of non-state capital into state-owned enterprises(SOEs)or encourages state capital participation in private enterprises,aims to integrate institutional and market forces to achieve complementary advantages.However,government agents representing state capital and market investors representing private capital are perceived to harbor divergent priorities.The former emphasizes resource allocation,seeking to address market failures and enhance social welfare through coordinating and subsidizing innovation processes.The latter prioritizes resource utilization,pursuing profit maximization through optimizing cost efficiency.Although a series of reforms centered on“decentralization”have explicitly shifted the objective of SOE management from“asset control”to“capital control,”the political will of the government can still profoundly influence the operating mechanisms and decision-making processes of SOEs through special arrangements such as top management team interlocked with members of Chinese Communist Party,and procedures for pre-review of major strategic decisions by Party committees.As a result,SOEs face prominent institutional logic conflicts under mixed-ownership reform,and extant studies have broadly discussed the impact of institutional logic conflicts on processes such as innovation and overseas investment of state-owned enterprises.Recent scholarship has introduced multi-tiered,cascading pyramid-shaped equity structures into the analytical framework of institutional logic conflicts in SOEs.Researchers posit that establishing intermediate institutional layers between SOEs and government supervisory agencies(e.g.,SASAC)can effectively mitigate direct government intervention,thereby granting SOEs enhanced strategic autonomy and even rights of“exemption”from certain institutional constraints.While these studies empirically examine the performance effects of pyramidal layers as predetermined institutional arrangements,they fail to unpack the form

关 键 词：混合所有制改革 国有企业 制度逻辑冲突 金字塔结构 隔板式治理 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]