定价自由化能够提升审计服务效率和质量吗?  

The Impact of In-laws’Involvement on Risk-taking Decisions in Family Firms:R&D Investment or Earnings Manipulation?

作　　者：邓婷友 陈宋生[1] Deng Tingyou;Chen Songsheng(Management School,Beijing Institute of Technology,Beijing 100081,China)

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理学院,北京100081

出　　处：《外国经济与管理》2025年第3期70-82,共13页Foreign Economics & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71972011);广东省普通高校人文社科重点研究基地项目(2023WZJD009);广东省实验教学示范中心(202401);珠海市哲学社会科学研究基地(202407)。

摘　　要：本文以2010-2019年上市公司为样本,探讨审计市场定价自由化对审计效率质量的影响。结果发现,审计价格放开后,审计效率(DEA)提升,审计质量(可操纵应计)提高。在采用平行趋势检验、替换变量衡量方式、加入市场反应后,结果仍然稳健。机制检验发现,审计投入增加、审计约谈加强、审计市场竞争加剧是审计价格放开提升审计效率和质量的三种途径。异质性检验发现,当市场化和法治化水平较低,以及在国有企业、低收费和收费下降的事务所,审计价格放开对审计效率和质量的提升作用更明显。价格放开重新强调价格机制在要素配置中的决定作用,本文为继续深化“放管服”改革提供了理论依据和实践参考。The antecedents of family firms'risk-taking decisions have been the focus of scholarship for a long time.With more and more family members getting involved in business activities,there are different kinship combinations within family firms,which gradually become one important factor that affects family firms'decision-making processes.In-laws'involvement can solve some difficulties,such as the scarcity of family venture capital,labor force,and social capital,which is conducive to developing family firms.But it may also increase the probability of family conflicts,which negatively affects family business.However,the question of how in-laws'involvement affects the risktaking decisions of family firms is still lacking of attention.Using the data set of China's listed family firms from 2008 to 2016,this paper explores the impact of in-laws'involvement on family firms'risktaking decisions from the perspective of R&D investment and earnings manipulation.The results show that in-laws taking the role of executives will significantly reduce the R&D investment motivation of family firms,while the earnings manipulation incentive will increase.Transforming in-law executives'roles of family agents by giving them shares can strengthen their R&D investment motivation and weaken their earnings manipulation incentive.Further analysis shows that different in-law relationships involved in management keep the same cautious attitude towards R&D investment.But they have different risk preferences for short-term oriented speculative decisions,which shows that close in-laws are more motivated to manipulate earnings.Besides,the involvement of the second generation in governance can increase both in-laws'R&D investment and earnings manipulation motivations.The negative performance feedback of firms can significantly increase in-laws'R&D investment motivation,but alleviate their earnings manipulation motivation.This paper offers several contributions:First,it takes in-laws'involvement as the breakthrough point and examines the mechanism of

关 键 词：审计定价管制 审计定价放开 审计效率 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]