董事会断裂带与审计意见购买  

Board Faultlines and Audit Opinion Shopping

作　　者：曹丰[1] 程家鸣 张雪燕 CAO Feng;CHENG Jiaming;ZHANG Xueyan

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院 [2]华南理工大学经济与金融学院

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2025年第4期61-77,共17页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“交易所问询函监管、上市公司信息披露质量与股票市场定价效率”(项目编号:71972068);全国会计领军(后备)人才项目。

摘　　要：审计意见购买作为破坏资本市场有效性的信息操纵行为备受学术界和监管层关注。本文以2007年至2021年A股上市公司为样本,探讨了董事会断裂带对管理层审计意见购买行为的影响。研究发现,董事会断裂带显著增加了管理层的审计意见购买行为,这一效应在管理层购买动机更强、董事会正式层级较高且非正式层级较低、内部与外部监督机制较弱、管理层在董事会中占比较高以及非国有企业中表现得尤为明显。进一步研究表明,尽管董事会断裂带未显著削弱董事会的咨询功能,却显著降低了其监督效率,导致管理层盈余管理等机会主义行为增加,使得公司支付了更高的审计费用,但这一行为并未显著提高非标准审计意见的获得概率,间接验证了审计意见购买的存在及其动机。本文研究不仅深化了对审计意见购买影响因素的理论认知,还为理解董事会构成对公司治理功能的作用机制提供了重要启示。Audit opinion shopping,as a form of information manipulation that undermines the efficiency of capital markets,has garnered significant attention from academics and regulators.Using a sample of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021,this study investigates the impact of board faultlines on managerial audit opinion shopping behavior.The findings reveal that the presence of board faultlines significantly increases the propensity of management to engage in audit opinion shopping.This effect is particularly pronounced when management has stronger incentives for opinion shopping,the board's formal hierarchy is higher while its informal hierarchy is lower,internal and external supervision is weaker,management holds a higher proportion of board seats,and in non-state-owned enterprises.Further analysis shows that while board faultlines do not significantly impair the board's advisory functions,they markedly weaken its supervisory effectiveness,leading to an increase in opportunistic behaviors,such as earnings management and higher audit fees.However,this behavior does not significantly increase the likelihood of obtaining non-standard audit opinions,indirectly validating the existence and motivations behind audit opinion shopping.This study not only enriches the theoretical understanding of the factors influencing audit opinion shopping but also provides critical insights into the mechanisms by which board composition affects corporate governance functions.

关 键 词：董事会断裂带 审计意见购买 盈余管理 审计收费 审计意见 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济] F239.4