电商购物节竞争性促销中的预售策略研究  

Research on Pre-sale Strategies in Competitive Promotions during E-commerce Shopping Festivals

作　　者：王小芳[1] 施梦璐 WANG Xiao-fang;SHI Meng-lu(University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《天津商务职业学院学报》2025年第1期71-80,共10页Journal of Tianjin College of Commerce

摘　　要：电商平台竞相举办购物节成为常见的商品促销方式。为争夺市场,零售商们在促销活动中纷纷“抢跑”,即采用预售策略。本文基于Hotelling模型的基本设置,考虑消费者类型、人数及其对商品估值的差异,构建零售商均不采取预售、实行对称预售以及非对称预售三种情形下的价格博弈模型。通过对比三种情形的均衡结果,并通过数字模拟,分析双寡头电商竞争性促销中预售策略对消费者选择、电商平台定价及利润的影响,探讨电商平台采用预售策略继而又取消的原因。短期来看,在一定市场条件下,零售商有抢先预售的动机,但从长期来看,都不预售应该是最优选择。The competing efforts of e-commerce platforms to hold shopping festivals have become a common means of promotion.To capture the bigger share,retailers"jump the gun"in promotional activities by adopting pre-sale strategies.Based on the Hotelling model framework,this study incorporates differences in consumer types,population size,and product valuations to construct price game models under three scenarios:no presale implementation by retailers,symmetric presale strategies,and asymmetric presale strategies.By comparing the equilibrium outcomes across these three scenarios and conducting numerical simulations,the paper analyzes how presale strategies influence consumer choices,platform pricing,and profit margins in duopoly e-commerce competition.It further investigates why e-commerce platforms initially adopt and subsequently abandon presale strategies.The findings suggest that while retailers are motivated to implement preemptive presales under certain short-term market conditions,abstaining from presale strategies altogether emerges as the optimal long-term choice.

关 键 词：电商预售策略 竞争 促销活动 购物节 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]