数字化转型与高管薪酬业绩敏感性  

Digital Transformation and Executive Pay-Performance Sensitivity

作　　者：金献坤 徐莉萍[2] 辛宇[2] 滕飞 Jin Xiankun;Xu Liping;Xin Yu;Teng Fei

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学会计学院 [2]中山大学管理学院 [3]中山大学马克思主义学院,510275

出　　处：《世界经济》2025年第4期170-196,共27页The Journal of World Economy

基　　金：2024年度浙江省哲学社会科学规划“省属高校基本科研业务费改革试点”专项课题(24NDJC306YBMS);广东省哲学社会科学规划2022年度重大基础理论研究专项项目(GD22ZDZGL02);广东省基础与应用基础研究基金委员会面上项目(2022A1515010294);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(24YJC790225)的资助。

摘　　要：数字化转型为企业带来新的发展动能的同时,也悄然助长了数字鸿沟与权力失衡,从而引发新的治理风险。本文在数字技术应用具有“双刃剑”效应的分析框架之下,探讨企业数字化转型对高管薪酬制定这一重要治理实践的影响,发现了治理风险效应的证据。研究结果表明,随着企业数字化转型的推进,高管薪酬契约呈现出“重奖轻罚”的非对称性特征,表现为高管因企业业绩差而降薪的程度减小。这是因为,数字化转型增加了企业内外的信息落差并促使企业控制权向智力资本转移,导致股东难以辨别企业经营不善的原因,同时高管可凭借更多的话语权为自己卸责,避免受到薪酬惩罚,使得高管薪酬与业绩“脱钩”。这一现象主要发生在企业数字化转型后期,最终会以损害企业未来发展为代价。As the principal driver of the current technological revolution and industrial transformation,the digital economy has become a crucial arena for global competition.Corporations,as the foundational units of the digital economy,are rapidly adopting advanced digital technologies to undertake digital transformation.While this process injects new dynamism into corporate development,it simultaneously amplifies existing digital divides and power asymmetries,consequently creating unprecedented governance challenges.Although extant literature robustly documents the positive effects of digital economy development and corporate digital transformation (CDT),it has largely overlooked the concomitant potential governance risks.Focusing on the design of executive compensation contracts?a core component of corporate governance?this paper assesses CDT’s dual impact on governance,revealing evidence of governance risk effects.The findings indicate that CDT reduces the performance-sensitivity of executive compensation,resulting in an asymmetric contractual compensation structure characterised by“significant rewards with lenient penalties”.In particular,executives rarely face compensation reductions despite declines in corporate performance.Mechanism analysis shows that CDT (i) widens information asymmetries between internal and external stakeholders,and (ii) reallocates corporate control towards intellectual capital.Consequently,shareholders encounter difficulties in identifying the root causes of poor managerial performance,while executives gain increased discretion to circumvent accountability and avoid compensation penalties,thereby weakening the compensation-performance linkage.This phenomenon predominantly emerges in advanced CDT stages and ultimately impairs future corporate performance.This study makes two principal contributions to the literature on CDT and executive compensation.First,unlike research that emphasises the beneficial effects of digital economy development,it highlights potential governance risks and chal

关 键 词：企业数字化转型 高管薪酬业绩敏感性 数字鸿沟 权力失衡 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]