道德实在论能否回答规范性问题?——科斯嘉与帕菲特之争  

Can Moral Realism Answer the Normative Question?——The Debate between Korsgaard and Parfit

作　　者：陈康 Chen Kang

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学马克思主义学院

出　　处：《中国社会科学院大学学报》2025年第3期111-125,147,148,共17页Journal of University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“规范性哲学研究”(21&ZD049);安徽财经大学科学研究基金资助项目“西方元伦理学中的理由基础主义研究”(ACKYB24018)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：在《规范性的来源》一书中,科斯嘉提出了著名的“规范性问题”,即如何解释道德的规范性权威。科斯嘉认为,道德实在论无法成功回答规范性问题。对此,帕菲特针锋相对地指出,只有道德实在论能够胜任这一任务。通过考察科斯嘉和帕菲特之间的争论,本文提出,道德实在论可以回答规范性问题,其关键在于如何诠释这一问题。而要想从根源上理解帕菲特和科斯嘉之间的争论,需要厘清两种规范性观念。归根结底,帕菲特和科斯嘉的分歧源于他们对规范性的本质和来源持有大相径庭的看法,阐明其各自的规范性观念不仅可以解析其争论的症结所在,而且有助于理解规范性研究的还原论路径和非还原论路径之争。In The Sources of Normativity,Korsgaard raises the now well-known “normative question ”,namely how to understand the normative authority of morality.Korsgaard argues that moral realism cannot adequately answer this question,while Parfit contends that only moral realism can provide a satisfactory response.In examining Korsgaard's criticisms of moral realism and Parfit's counterarguments,this paper argues that whether moral realism can answer the normative question depends on how we interpret that question.To uncover the root of the debate between Korsgaard and Parfit,we need to clarify two conceptions of normativity.As we will see,the disagreement between them ultimately stems from their distinct views on normativity.Clarifying their conceptions not only illuminates the crux of their disagreement but also enhances our understanding of the debates between normative reductionists and normative non-reductionists.

关 键 词：规范性问题 道德实在论 规范性 科斯嘉 帕菲特 

分 类 号：B82-0[哲学宗教—伦理学]