党组织嵌入、管理层权力与异常关联交易  

Party Organization Embeddedness, Managerial Power andAbnormal Related Transactions

作　　者：徐琳[1] 张斌[1] XU Lin;ZHANG Bin(College of Business Administration,Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu,Anhui 233030)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学工商管理学院,安徽蚌埠233030

出　　处：《商学研究》2025年第2期105-115,128,共12页Commercial Science Research

基　　金：安徽省高校人文社会科学研究重点项目“反腐败提升国有企业绩效了吗?———基于内部控制视角的研究”(SK2020A0023)。

摘　　要：基于权力过程理论,以2017—2021年沪深股市国有上市公司为样本,重点考察党组织嵌入对国有企业异常关联交易的影响及其作用机制。根据实证结果,党组织嵌入国有企业治理,无论是“双向进入”还是“交叉任职”,对异常关联交易都有着显著的抑制作用,具体则是通过弱化管理层权力得以实现,尤其在外部制度环境较好的地区和行政控制较低的企业中表现得更为明显。研究结论表明,作为具有中国特色的治理制度设计,将党建引领纳入国有企业治理,切实有效地促进了国有企业治理工作的改善与提升。Based on the theory of power process,and taking state-owned listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2017 to 2021 as samples,this study focuses on the impact and mechanism of party organization embeddedness on abnormal related-party transactions of state-owned enterprises.According to empirical results,party organization embeddedness in the governance of state-owned enterprises,whether through“two-way entry”or“cross-appointment”,has a significant inhibitory effect on abnormal related transactions.Specifically,this is achieved by weakening the managerial power,especially in areas with better external institutional environments and enterprises with lower administrative control.The research conclusion shows that as a governance system design with Chinese characteristics,incorporating party building guidance into the governance of state-owned enterprises has effectively promoted the improvement and enhancement of state-owned enterprise governance work.

关 键 词：党组织嵌入 管理层权力 异常关联交易 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] D267[经济管理—国民经济]