不同博弈机制下零售商主导供应链的低碳技术投资与成本分摊决策  

Low-Carbon Technology Investment and Cost-Sharing Decisions in a Retailer-Led Supply Chain under Different Game Mechanisms

作　　者：梁开荣 胡渝婕 陈丽强 LI Kevin W. LIANG Kairong;HU Yujie;CHEN Liqiang;LI Kevin W.(School of Management Science and Engineering,Nanjing University of Information Science&Technology,Nanjing 210044,China;School of Culture Tourism and Public Administration,Fujian Normal University,Fuzhou 350117,China;Odette School of Business,University of Windsor,Windsor N9B 3P4,Canada)

机构地区：[1]南京信息工程大学管理工程学院,江苏南京210044 [2]福建师范大学文化旅游与公共管理学院,福建福州350117 [3]加拿大温莎大学奥德特商学院,安大略省温莎N9B 3P4

出　　处：《工业工程》2025年第2期129-140,共12页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：江苏高校哲学社会科学研究资助项目(2024SJYB0146);南京信息工程大学人才启动经费资助项目(1523142401016);福建省社会科学基金青年项目(FJ2024C071);河北省高等学校自然科学青年拔尖人才项目(BJK2024154)。

摘　　要：随着全球气候逐渐变暖,人们的环境保护意识日益增强,低碳经济和可持续发展已成为全球共识。作为能源消耗和碳排放的重要领域,供应链管理在推动绿色低碳转型中扮演着关键角色。苹果公司的供应商能效项目作为行业典范,通过激励其供应链伙伴推动低碳技术的开发与应用,有效降低了整体碳足迹,提升了供应链的环境绩效。受苹果公司成功案例的启发,考虑一个供应商和一个零售商组成的低碳供应链,构建一个无低碳激励的两期Stackelberg模型、两个不同博弈机制的低碳激励模型(单期和两期Stackelberg模型),并与已有低碳技术投资两型博弈机制进行比较,深入探讨不同博弈机制对供应商低碳技术投资行为与零售商成本分摊行为的影响。研究结果表明:1)零售商低碳技术投资成本分摊行为有助于实现利润双赢;2)零售商总是偏好单期Stackelberg博弈机制下开展决策行为,且可以通过单边支付激励供应商选择单期Stackelberg博弈机制,以实现双赢;3)两型博弈机制下供应商可以实现更高的低碳技术水平;4)从供应链系统利润来看,单期Stackelberg博弈机制和两型博弈机制优于两期Stackelberg博弈机制。本研究对于理解和改进低碳供应链的生产运作管理具有理论指导意义,同时也为实现碳达峰、碳中和的“双碳”目标提供了新的策略思考。With the intensification of global warming and the increasing awareness of environmental protection,low-carbon economy and sustainable development have become a global consensus.As an important area of energy consumption and carbon emissions,supply chain management plays a key role in driving the green and low-carbon transition.Following Apple's Supplier Energy Efficiency Program,this paper considers a low-carbon retailer-led supply chain consisting of a retailer and supplier.We establish a two-period Stackelberg model without low-carbon incentive and a low-carbon incentive model with two different game mechanisms(one-period and two-period Stackelberg models),and compare the relevant results with an existing biform game mechanism for low-carbon technology(LCT)investment.Then,the supplier's investment behavior in LCT and the retailer's cost sharing behavior under different game mechanisms are discussed and analyzed.Analytic results show that,1)The cost-sharing behavior of retailer in LCT investment is conducive to a“win-win”outcome;2)Retailer always prefer to carry out decision-making behavior under the one-period Stackelberg game mechanism,and it can motivate suppliers to choose the one-period Stackelberg game mechanism through side-payment to achieve a win-win outcome;3)Supplier can achieve a higher level of low-carbon technology under the biform game mechanism;4)From the perspective of supply chain system profit,both one-stage Stackelberg game and biform game mechanisms are superior to two-stage Stackelberg game mechanism.This study can provide theoretical methods for production and operation management in the low-carbon supply chain,and make a new way for double carbon goals of achieving carbon peak,carbon neutral.

关 键 词：低碳供应链 投资决策 成本分摊 STACKELBERG博弈 两型博弈 运营管理 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]