两权分离的实质与我国股份制企业的内部人控制问题  

Separation of Ownership and Control & Insiders' Control in China's Corporations

作　　者：潘敏[1] 谢献谋[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学商学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《武汉大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2003年第1期87-93,共7页Wuhan University Journal：Philosophy & Social Science

摘　　要：股份制企业的所有权与控制权分离源于股份制企业制度下的企业法人资产制度和股权自由交易的股票市场制度。以经营管理者为代表的内部人对企业日常经营管理权的控制是两权分离下的股份制企业制度的基本特征之一。我国股份制企业公司治理结构的显著特征并非真正意义上的内部人控制,而是国有股股东的外部控制。国有股股东外部控制下的企业法人资产制度不健全、融资结构不合理以及缺乏有效的企业破产制度是导致当前我国股份制企业公司治理结构效率低下的主要原因。The separation of ownership and control of corporations lies on system for corporate asset, limited liabilities of stockholders and the system of stock market which equity exchange is free. Possessing the control rights for decision management by the corporate insiders, such as managers, is the one of the characters of corporation under the separation of ownership and control. The obvious character of corporate governance in China's corporations is not the insiders' control, but the outsiders' control of stated\|stockholders. The main reasons of the inefficiencies of corporate governance in China's corporations are the imperfect system for corporate asset, non\|optimum in capital structure and the ineffective bankruptcy mechanism. 

关 键 词：所有权与控制权分离 内部人控制 企业法人资产制度 公司治理结构 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]