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机构地区:[1]华侨大学,福建泉州362021
出 处:《上海金融学院学报》2015年第5期105-114,共10页Journal of Shanhai Finance University
基 金:国家旅游局规划项目(14TABG029);福建省自然科学基金计划资助项目(2014J01267)
摘 要:以2009-2013年23家旅游上市公司作为研究样本,通过多元回归模型检验我国旅游上市公司高管薪酬是否存在粘性特征。实证结果表明:当公司业绩上升时高管薪酬增加的幅度大于公司业绩降低时高管薪酬减少的幅度,说明高管薪酬存在粘性特征,但回归结果在统计上不显著。根据研究结论,文章建议旅游上市公司的高管薪酬机制设定须兼具激励与约束之功能、实施股权激励,应强化政府监管和舆论监督并行措施。In recent years, the endless executives "astronomical salaries" phenomenon caused the public to question the rationality of executive compensation. In order to alleviate the public controversy and discontent, our government promulgated "salary limit order" and other policies to intervene executive compensation. After that , whether the executive compensation of Chinese listed tourism companies stickiness still exist? This paper conducted theoretical and multiple regression analysis of executive compensation stickiness for Chinese listed companies in the tourism sector during 2009-2013. All financial data and relevant information on compensation and firm performance used in this study came from annual financial reports of listed tourism companies. The results show that: executive compensation and firm performance showed a significant positive correlation, which indicated that it has been established a compensation system associated with the firm performance; further found that when the firm performance rise, the increase of executive compensation was greater than it reduce when the firm performance decrease , but the result was not significant. Finally, according to the results, the paper puts forward that the executive compensation mechanism of listed tourism companies should have the functions of incentive and constraint, implement equity incentive, and the government should strengthen supervision measures.
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