高校科研激励机制构建研究  

Research on the Construction of Incentive Mechanism of Scientific Research in Universities

作　　者：张冰[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津商业大学社科管理处,天津300134

出　　处：《科教导刊》2016年第8Z期31-33,159,共4页The Guide Of Science & Education

基　　金：天津商业大学青年基金项目(编号:151123)

摘　　要：由于高校科研活动具有投入难以观测等特点,导致作为科研管理者的高校和教师之间存在信息不对称,以致高校激励教师积极开展科研工作的效果较差,教师对科研工作的积极性不高。针对信息不对称问题,本文运用委托代理理论,在高校和教师之间构建博弈模型,通过分析各类约束条件寻找能够提高教师科研积极性的措施,进而以此为基础构建有效的高校教师激励机制。As a result of scientific research in Colleges and universities is difficult to observe the characteristics of input, result as for the management of scientific research in universities and teachers between the existence of information asymmetry, that colleges and universities encourage teachers to actively carry out research work effect is poorer, the enthusiasm of the teachers of the research work is not high. Aiming at the problem of asymmetric information. In this paper, the use of principal-agent theory, build game model between the universities and teachers, through the analysis of all kinds of constraint conditions to find measures to improve the enthusiasm of teachers in scientific research, then taking this as the foundation construction effective university teacher incentive mechanism.

关 键 词：科研积极性 信息不对称 激励机制 

分 类 号：G644[文化科学—高等教育学]