我国国有企业委托代理中存在的问题及对策  

On Existing Problems in Principal-Agent of China State-owned Firms & Their Countermeasures

作　　者：夏林[1] 黎志成[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《河南金融管理干部学院学报》2003年第2期83-85,共3页Journal of Henan College of Financial Management Cadres

摘　　要：由于委托人与代理人利益的不一致和信息的不对称,委托—代理关系往往会导致“代理问题”。在我国国有企业体制转轨时期,这一问题尤为突出。原因主要有:资本市场不发达;经理人员市场起步晚;代理链过长;代理人责权利不对称等。而要解决这一“代理问题”,必须尽快建立新型的激励约束机制。Owing to disagreement between interests of principals and those of agents, and information asymmetry, principal & agent relationship often results in 'agent problem', which is highlighted during transforming of state-owned firm regimes. The reasons for that problem are as follows:under developed capital market; delayed development of agent market; too long agent linkage; unequal responsibilities, rights and benefits amongst a-gents. We must establish new impel-constraining mechancism to solve this 'agent problem'as soon as possible.

关 键 词：问题 对策 国有企业 委托-代理制度 “代理问题” 激励约束机制 中国 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F276.1[经济管理—国民经济]