电力市场中的激励性机制设计  

INCENTIVE MECHANISM DESIGN IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS

作　　者：张少华[1] 方勇[1] 李渝曾[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海大学自动化系,上海200072

出　　处：《电网技术》2003年第1期52-56,共5页Power System Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(50102006)

摘　　要：简要说明了电力市场中应用激励性机制设计理论的意义和一般方法,着重介绍和分析了有关激励性发电上网竞价机制及激励性双边合同设计的应用研究。分析表明,激励性发电上网竞价机制能引导理性发电商披露真实成本信息,有利于实现电力资源的经济调度;激励性电力竞价机制可避免或减轻发电商利用市场力操纵市场的行为,因而有助于降低市场价格剧烈波动的风险,进而改善市场运行的平稳性与安全性;激励性的可中断合同机制有利于实现市场环境下电力资源的最优分配,激励性的投资招标合同能进一步实现电力投资市场风险和利润的合理分摊。The significance and the general method to apply the incentive mechanism design theory to electricity markets are briefly described. Research works related to incentive mechanism design for power generation bidding and bilateral contracting are emphatically presented and analyzed. It is indicated that the incentive bidding mechanism can lead the rational generation companies to reveal their true generation costs. Therefore, it is advantageous for implementig the economic dispatch of electricity resources. Besides, the behavior of rigging the market from the generation companies by market power can be avoided or mitigated, so it is conducive to reduce the risk of drastic fluctuation of market price, and then the steadiness and security of market operation can be improved. On the other hand, the incentive interruptible contractual mechanism is advantageous to implementing the optimal allocation of electricity resources under the market environment and the rational sharing of the risk and profits in the power investment market can be further realized by the incentive contract for investment project bidding.

关 键 词：电力市场 激励性机制 设计 投资 上网竞价 电价 电力工业 

分 类 号：F407.61[经济管理—产业经济]