不对称信息条件下抵押品的信号作用分析  

Analysis of Signaling Actions on Collateral under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：黎荣舟[1] 庞素琳 徐建闽[1] 罗伟其[2] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学交通学院,广东广州510640 [2]暨南大学信息学院

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2003年第2期35-39,共5页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：广东省计委高技术项目 (粤计高 2 0 0 1 30 0 9)

摘　　要：主要研究两个方面的内容 :1 )不对称信息条件下 ,当企业追求机会利益时 ,贷款利率和企业拖欠还款概率的变化对银行期望利润的影响 ;2 )当企业具有多个连续投资项目时 ,在不对称信息条件下 ,贷款利率的变化对企业项目平均成功概率的影响 .研究结果表明 ,如果企业提供的抵押品价值越少 ,银行信贷资金所面临的风险越大 ,逆向选择风险增大 ;如果企业提供的抵押品价值越多 ,银行信贷资金所面临的风险越小 ,逆向选择风险减少 .In this paper, we primary study two contents: 1) The effect of the changes of both the loan interest rate and the defaulting probability of the entrepreneur on the expected profits of the banks when the entrepreneur pursues opportunity benefit under asymmetric information. 2) The effect of the change of the loan interest rate on the average successful probability of the project of the entrepreneur when the entrepreneur have multi-continuous projects under asymmetric information. The studies show that, the less collateral value the entrepreneur provides is, the higher credit risk to the bank is and the larger risk of adverse selection is; the more collateral value the entrepreneur provides is, the lower credit risk to the bank is and the smaller risk of adverse selection is.

关 键 词：信息不对称 机会利益 贷款利率 拖欠概率 抵押品 信号作用 逆向选择 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学] F224.32