终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效  

The Ultimate Ownership and Its Shareholding Structures:Does It Matter for Corporate Performance?

作　　者：刘芍佳 孙霈[2] 刘乃全[3] 

机构地区：[1]英国布鲁耐尔大学 [2]英国剑桥大学 [3]上海财经大学,200433

出　　处：《经济研究》2003年第4期51-62,共12页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：上海财经大学"创值课题研究项目"的部分成果

摘　　要：本文应用终极产权论 (theprincipleofultimateownership)对中国上市公司的控股主体重新进行分类 ,结果发现 ,中国 84%的上市公司最终仍由政府控制 ,而非政府控制的比例仅为 1 6% ,因此目前上市公司的股本结构仍然是国家主导型的。然而 ,官方统计报告中对股本类型所做的国有股与法人股之分类 ,不可避免地导致了对中国上市公司终极产权者的模糊界定 ,进而使许多先前从事股权结构对公司绩效影响的研究误入歧途。本文按照新的控股主体分类标准对不同的控股类型———如国家直接控股模式与国家间接控股模式等 ,进行了绩效筛选比较 ,并发现中国上市公司的股权结构与公司绩效确实密切相关。具体来说 ,在国家最终掌控的上市公司中 ,相对来讲代理效率损失最低的企业具有以下特点 :(1 )国家间接控股 ;(2 )同行同专业的公司控股 ;(3 )整体上市。此结论为今后上市公司的公司治理结构、特别是股权结构的改革方向提供了重要的实证依据与理论启示。Does the class of shareholdings matter for corporate performance?According to the principle of ultimate ownership,our paper found that at present the shareholding structure of Chinese quoted companies is state-dominant in that 84% of public companies are ultimately controlled by the state,compared with 16% of non-state-controlled ones.In contrast to our identified shareholdings,the Chinese official shareholding record only reports the state and the legal person share classes that are inevitably ambiguous for the identification of ultimate owners of public corporations,which in turn has misled many previous studies in assessing the impact of shareholding classes on performance.Based on our newly established shareholding classes,we make a nested performance comparison between these different classes,such as the state direct control versus the state indirect control,and find significant evidence from the Chinese data that the class of shareholdings does matter for company performance.

关 键 词：终极产权论 股权结构 公司绩效 中国 上市公司 控股权 金字塔型持股结构 公司治理 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]