分工演化与关系型融资:中小企业融资问题的新理论解释  

Division of Labor and Evolution and Relational Financing:New Theory Explaining The Issue of SME Financing

作　　者：陈晓红[1] 黎璞[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学,长沙410083

出　　处：《管理评论》2003年第5期17-22,共6页Management Review

摘　　要：本文首先运用专业化分工和演进理论分析中小企业融资困难的成因,指出其根源在于经济转轨时期分工不发达和协调失灵所至。然后引入关系型融资和意会知识的概念,提出关系型融资模式适用于中国经济转轨时期的中小企业融资。通过简化的两期融资模型证明掌握意会知识能有效降低融资过程中的信息不对称程度,其中无风险利率和未来预期收益对关系型融资有较大的影响。同时文章指出,中小企业的关系型融资模式与金融创新具有兼容性,不存在所谓间接融资的制度缺陷。This paper tries to explain the issue of small-and medium-sized enterprises'(SMEs)financing by division of labor and evolution theory.The issue results from the incomplete division of labor during the economic reform and transition period.The paper introduces the concept of tacit knowledge,and argues that the relational financing is suitable to the Chinese SMEs.A simplified two-stage model verifies that tacit knowledge can reduce the level of information asymmetric in the financing process,and shows that the risk free interest rate and expected revenue affect relational financing.

关 键 词：中小企业 融资问题 理论解释 理论分析 融资模式 关系型融资模式 信息不对称程度 

分 类 号：F276.3[经济管理—企业管理]