Power Pool中发电公司竞价问题的微观经济学分析  

MICROECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF BIDDING STRATEGIES OF POWER CORPORATIONS IN POWER POOL

作　　者：汤玉东[1] 吴军基[2] 邹云[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学自动化系 [2]南京理工大学动力学院,江苏省南京市210094

出　　处：《电力系统自动化》2003年第15期15-19,24,共6页Automation of Electric Power Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目 ( 60 0 740 0 7)

摘　　要：运用微观经济学理论研究了PowerPool模式中发电公司的竞价问题。首先 ,通过对寡头市场的均衡分析指出 ,PowerPool模式中发电公司采取策略性报价是寡头企业长期均衡的必然结果。其次 ,运用供给函数均衡分析指出 ,发电公司的优化报价策略是报价高于边际成本 ,发电公司的优化报价曲线经过发电公司面对其自身剩余需求曲线单独决策时的最优化点 ,市场的统一清除价必定等于发电公司面对其自身剩余需求曲线单独决策时的最优化点的价格 ,市场均衡解存在且惟一。最后 ,探讨了均衡解与市场力之间的关系 。The bidding strategies of the power corporations in Power Pool are analyzed. It is investigated that the power corporations in the Power Pool must bid the untrue cost for survival by analysis of the long equilibrium in oligopoly. Some meaningful results about the bidding strategies are obtained by analyzing the supply function equilibrium in the Power Pool. Based on these results, the relation between market power and equilibrium is studied, and the conclusion that the CFD can reduce the market power is also drawn.

关 键 词：发电竞价 电力市场 微观经济学 寡头市场 市场力 差价合约 

分 类 号：F426.61[经济管理—产业经济]