人事任用问题的不完全信息信号博奕  

Incomplete information signal game of Personnel appointment matters

作　　者：王晓华[1] 王浣尘[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学管理学院

出　　处：《上海管理科学》2003年第3期55-56,共2页Shanghai Management Science

摘　　要：人事任用问题是一个社会非常重要而基本的问题。一般由于信息的不对称,人事部门很难完全了解被任用人的素质,从而做出合适的人事安排。本文采用博奕论和信息经济学的基本原理对此进行了分析,分析表明:人事任用问题实际上是一个不完全信息动态信号博奕过程,人事部门只要设计出具有足够信息量的信号,在博奕过程中产生分离均衡。这样,就可以通过被任用人发出的信号识别出其类型,从而做出适当的人事安排,最终达到人才资源的最优配置。Personnel appointment matters is a very important and basic problem in a society. In general, It is very difficult for the department of Personnel matters to know the quality of appointee candidate and make a appropriate personnel appointment because of information asymmetry. The problem is analyzed by applying the principle of game theory and information economics in the paper. The analysis shows: Personnel appointment matters is a process of Incomplete information signal game. If the department of Personnel matters could find the signal with enough information, separating equilibrium will appear in the game process. Therefore, The appropriate Personnel appointment can be done and the optimized human resource will be attained based on the type the type of appointee candidate recognized through signal he or she sends.

关 键 词：人事任用 不完全信息信号博弈 分离均衡 类型 人事安排 人才资源配置 最优化 信息经济学 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] C931[经济管理—国民经济]