寡头企业价格领先竞争的均衡性  

Existence Analysis of Price Leadership Model Equilibrium

作　　者：郭春香[1] 刘志涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南科技大学,四川绵阳621002

出　　处：《西南科技大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2003年第2期18-21,共4页Journal of Southwest University of Science and Technology:Philosophy and Social Science Edition

基　　金：西南科技大学青年预研基金

摘　　要：首先介绍完全信息时双寡头垄断的企业价格决策的静态模型,得到伯川德均衡;然后介绍完全信息时双寡头垄断的企业价格决策的动态模型,得到价格领先的寡头竞争模型均衡解;最后分析了后者的局限性,得到在理性假设的前提下价格领先的寡头竞争模型的均衡解不是一个稳定状态,完全信息时双寡头价格决策的动态博弈的结果必然最终趋近于静态博弈的结果。First, a model of static games of complete information in price plan of duopoly is introduced, which results in Betrand model equilibrium; then, a model of dynamic games of complete information is presented, which leads to price leadership model equilibrium of duopoly: at last, the limitation of the latter is analyzed, which shows that the price leadership equilibrium is not stable and that the equilibrium in price leadership model of duopoly would trend to Bertrand equilibrium.

关 键 词：寡头企业 价格决策 寡头竞争模型 均衡解 理性假设 价格领先竞争 均衡性 博弈论 

分 类 号：F276.4[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]