一股独大不利于公司治理吗——基于持股模式和两类治理成本的经验证据  

Is the Single Big Holder Bad for Corporate Governance: An Evidence Based on Shareholding Model and Two Types of Governance Cost

作　　者：尹筑嘉[1] 黄建欢[2] 肖敏[2] 

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学经济与管理学院,湖南长沙410114 [2]湖南大学经济与贸易学院,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《广东财经大学学报》2015年第6期60-72,共13页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(15BGL041);湖南省自然科学基金项目(13JJ3052)

摘　　要：一股独大现象是中国上市公司的典型特征,如何看待和应对该现象是公司治理理论和实践亟待回答的重大问题。利用2003年~2013年的大样本数据,依据实际控制人持股和竞争性股权的比例将持股模式分为四类,以研究不同模式的一股独大在两类公司治理成本方面的差异。结果表明:大股东持股比例高的绝对控股和集中型相对控股模式具有两类治理成本“双低”的特征;分散持股模式和大股东持股比例低的分散型相对控股模式具有两类治理成本“双高”的特征,且分散型相对控股模式的第二类治理成本最高。股权分置改革有助于改善治理环境和降低治理成本,但对不同持股模式和不同治理成本的影响有差异。研究表明,不能简单否定一股独大,而应区分模式看待。高持股集中度下的一股独大有助于改善公司治理,但低持股水平下的一股独大可能带来严重的两类公司治理问题,应作为监督管理之重点。Single big holder is the typical characteristic of Chinese listed companies. How to look upon and cope with this phenomenon is an important problem to be resolved in theory and reality. This paper uses the 2003 ~ 2013 data to survey the difference of single big holders in two forms of governance cost by classifying shareholder models into four categories. The empirical results show that for the high proportion controlling types such as majority controlling type and centralized relative controlling type,the two forms of governance cost are lower than those ofdispersed relative controlling type and dispersed controlling type,with the second-type governance cost of dispersed relative controlling type beingthe highest. Non-tradable share reform helps to improve governance environment and decrease governance cost,but it has different impacts on different shareholder models and governance costs. The paper finally concludes that the phenomenon of single big holder cannot be denied simply,but should be treated according to models; high proportion controlling types improve corporate governance,while low proportion controlling types may bring serious governance problems,which should be the emphasis of supervision.

关 键 词：一股独大 实际控制人 持股模式 治理成本 股权分置改革 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]