虚拟组织集体选择问题研究  

Research on Collective-choice Problem of Virtual Organization

作　　者：邢永杰[1] 张世英[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学,天津300072

出　　处：《山东财政学院学报》2003年第5期8-13,共6页Journal of Shandong Finance Institute

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目 (6 98740 2 8)

摘　　要：本文通过对虚拟组织集体选择问题产生背景的分析 ,提出了合作伙伴的相关策略 ;运用博弈的方法分析了集体选择中的信息激励约束与参与约束 ,证明了合作伙伴合作条件的区间和均衡的合作条件 ,阐述了集体选择问题所涉及的合作失败成本与合作延误成本 ,以及两者之间的相互转化关系。This paper puts forward correlative strategy for cooperating partnership through analyzing the context from which the collective-choice problem of virtual organization derived. By using the method of game analysis, it analyses the informational incentive constraints and participation constraints of collective-choice. The space and equilibrium of cooperation conditions are argued, and the costs of failure to cooperate and cost of delay and interchangeable relationship between them are also dwelled on.

关 键 词：虚拟组织 集体选择 企业 合作伙伴 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]