资本账户和经常账户负面冲击与钉住汇率制度危机的理论分析  

External Shocks and the Collapse of the Pegged Exchange Rate Regime

作　　者：孙华妤[1] 马跃[1,2,3] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院 [2]香港岭南大学经济系 [3]中山大学岭南学院

出　　处：《世界经济》2003年第10期3-9,共7页The Journal of World Economy

基　　金：对外经贸大学资助项目;香港岭南大学研究基金资助项目(批号:DR0383);香港特区政府大学研究资助局角逐拨款(Competitive Earmarked Research Grant)项目(批号:LU3110/03H)的部分成果。

摘　　要：本文通过一个货币模型说明在国际资本有相互替代和流动的可能性、国内政策和经济基本面表现良好的条件下,如果外部国际收支账户冲击的规模足够大、持续时间足够长,钉住汇率亦不能够坚持,从而发生货币危机。得到的政策建议是,如果外部冲击来自资本账户,则加强资本管制,有助于钉住平价的维持;如果外部冲击来自经常账户,就要放松资本管制,才有助于维持钉住平价。另外,资产的替代程度与国际流动性对于汇率平价的影响既有相同之处,又有不同之处。国际收支账户持续为负时,资产的替代程度的增加,可以延缓储备的耗竭,有利于钉住汇率平价的维持。把资产组合的调整速度和资产的替代性都包括在资本流动性概念中,是有缺陷的假设。In this paper, we build a monetary model that focuses on external factors that cause the collapse of the pegged exchange rate system. Pegged exchange rate system cannot survive under a persistent external shock on the balance of payments. Given the scale of large shock, the peg will collapse even if the domestic policy and the fundamentals are sound. Capital control is effective only if the shock is capital outflow shock. A current account deficit shock, however, requires more capital inflow to prevent the depletion of foreign reserves and therefore requests less capital control. Another contribution of this paper is to distinguish the effect of capital mobility with that of the asset substitutability. We show that these two effects can be totally different for the pegged exchange rate system under different shocks.

关 键 词：资本账户 经常账户 钉住汇率制度 货币模型 国际收支账户冲击 货币危机 

分 类 号：F830.7[经济管理—金融学]