两层供应链中的上游R&D补贴策略  

Upstream R&D subsidizing policy in a two-tier supply chain

作　　者：霍沛军[1] 陈剑[1] 陈继祥[2] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084 [2]上海交通大学工商管理系,上海200052

出　　处：《清华大学学报（自然科学版）》2003年第10期1297-1300,共4页Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70071016);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2002);清华大学经济管理学院基础研究基金重点项目(2001002)

摘　　要：为弥补研究与发展(R&D)问题的研究基本没有涉及到供应链的缺憾,以博弈论为工具,针对一个两层供应链系统,考虑政府对上游垄断企业的R&D补贴策略。上游垄断企业为下游企业提供投入品,而下游企业在市场上进行产量竞争;在生产投入品之前,上游企业从事成本降低型R&D。研究了政府的最优R&D补贴问题;同时分析了下游企业数量变动对R&D产出、投入、产量和利润等变量产生的影响。结果表明:R&D补贴率仅与下游企业数量有关,而与其他变量无关;下游企业数量越大,补贴率越小。Few research and development (R&D) studies have considered the effects of supply chains. This paper uses game theory to study the government's R&D subsidizing policy to a monopolistic upstream firm in a twotier supply chain. The upstream firm provides an input to the downstream firms, which engage in output competition on the market. Before producing the input, the upstream firm conducts costreducing R&D. This paper studies how the government optimize the R&D subsidy. The study shows that the R&D subsidy is related only to the number of downstream firms and is unrelated to other parameters, with a larger number of downstream firms requiring smaller subsidies. The study also analyzes the effects of changes in the number of downstream firms on the R&D output, R&D input, quantities, and profits.

关 键 词：供应链管理 上游企业 R&D 补贴策略 研究 发展 补贴率 博弈论 技术创新 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F273.1[经济管理—国民经济]