监督和风险企业控制权安排的关系分析  

On the Relationship Between Monitoring and the Arrangement of Control Power in VC-backed Firms

作　　者：朱心来[1] 和丕祥[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学管理学院,浙江杭州310029

出　　处：《商业研究》2003年第23期116-118,共3页Commercial Research

摘　　要：在风险企业中,风险资本家的主要功能是监督。通过他的监督,降低了创业家选择好行为的机会成本,减少了为了满足他的激励兼容约束而必须给予他的收益,放松了项目得以实施对创业家自有资本的要求,提高了项目融资的可能性。为了保证风险资本家监督的有效性,必须赋予他对风险企业的控制权。与成熟企业不同,风险资本家的控制权大小与他投入的资金多少并没有直接联系。他往往具有超比例的控制权,甚至控制董事会的权力。In the VC-backed firm, the venture capitalists major function is monitoring the entrepreneur. His monitoring can reduce the entrepreneur's opportunistic cust of his selecting a good item, so can his own capital required by the item. This improves the possibility of financing the item. In order to ensure his monitoring effectively, the control power over the firm must be given to the venture capitalist. Compared with the crop firm, his control power does not have a direct connection with his capital inputted in the firm. He always has more-than-proportional representation on, or even control over the board.

关 键 词：风险企业 控制权 企业家 风险资本家 风险投资 风险资本 融资 监督 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济]