风险企业的控制权分配与融资工具选择  

The Control Rights Allocation and the Financing Instruments Choice in Venture Capital for Venture Enterprises

作　　者：陈辉[1] 陈国进[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《金融理论与实践》2004年第1期4-6,共3页Financial Theory and Practice

摘　　要：为解决风险企业信息不对称导致的代理问题,风险企业的控制权具有明显的相机转移特征。通过对各种融资工具现金流和控制权特征的比较,以及对各国在风险融资工具选择上存在差异性的现实原因、我国风险企业现状及发展前景的分析,可以认为,可转换证券是我国风险企业未来融资工具的最佳选择。In order to solve the agency problems induced by asymmetric information, the control rights in venture capital is of remarkable characteristics of appropriate transfer. This paper makes a comparison among the cash flows generated from various financing instruments and the control-right characteristics, probes into the actual causes of the differences in venture financing instruments, and analyzes the present conditions and future prospects. The author believes that convertible securities is the best choice for the future financing instruments of our venture enterprises.

关 键 词：风险企业 融资工具 可转换证券 信息不对称 中国 资本市场 

分 类 号：F275.1[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]