Newsboy问题中的供应商质量决策  

Supplier's Quality Decision in Newsboy Problem

作　　者：崔益明[1] 金星[1] 朱道立[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理科学系,上海200433

出　　处：《物流技术》2003年第12期52-54,共3页Logistics Technology

摘　　要：对Newsboy问题在产品质量方面做了扩展,构造了随机需求和产品质量之间的关系,通过销售商决定订货批量,制造商决定产品质量构成了供应链双方的博弈。对此博弈的Nash均衡解做了分析,讨论了一些价格变化对均衡质量水平的影响,并讨论了销售商给予制造商质量激励的情形,确定了有效激励区间和最优激励强度。The paper extends the newsboy problem in product quality and builds the relationship between stochastic demand and product quality. The retailer determines order quantity while the manufacturer determines quality. This combines the game in supply chain. Then, it analyzes the Nash equilibrium solution, discusses how the quality changes according to some prices and gives out the effective incentive interval and best incentive intensity when the retailer gives the manufacturer incentive.

关 键 词：Newsboy问题 产品质量 供应商 制造商 供应链管理 销售商 NASH均衡 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]