国有企业民营化的竞争与均衡模型  

作　　者：胡兴华[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学经济系

出　　处：《财经科学》2004年第1期41-45,共5页Finance & Economics

摘　　要：在现实经济中 ,处于转型经济中的政府通常保留一定的被私有化企业的股份。在生产差别产品的双寡头模型里 ,我们考察了部分国有对企业投资和产出行为的影响机制。从而得出结论 :政府所保留股份的最适宜份额取决于产品市场的竞争。并进一步探讨了在哪种情况下把两个公司出售给唯一买主是更可取的。本文的理论模型有助于更好地理解和解决在我国市场经济和转型经济条件下的国有大中型企业重组 ,国有资产的战略性退出以及明晰现代产权制度等问题。In practice, governments in transition and other economies often retain some shares in privatized firms. For a two-firm differentiated-product oligopoly, we show how partial state ownership affects the firms' subsequent investment and output behavior. Hence,we determine how the optimum retained state ownership share depends on product-market competitiveness and we find the conditions under which it would be preferable to sell the firms to a single owner. Partial state ownership is optimal. The theoretical model could be useful for China to understand the problems of the reconstructing of state enterprise, withdrawal of state assets in market economy and transitional ecnomy.

关 键 词：私有化 部分国有 竞争 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]